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Executive summary
The protection gap. The economic and social impact of disasters is increasing all around the 
world. In 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria were so destructive as they swept through the 
Caribbean that they decimated many of these small island economies. Even in a wealthy country 
like the USA, the economic impact of these natural disasters was enormous. In recent years, 
earthquakes dealt a blow to Mexico, France saw the worst rains in 50 years with floods peaking in 
Paris, typhoons and storms shook the Philippines and Hong Kong, and wildfires ravaged California 
and Australia. 
Yet, the economic losses from such disasters are underinsured. In what is known as the protection 
gap, some 70% of global losses from natural catastrophes are not insured, equating to $1.3 
trillion over the past 10 years. In 2017 alone, uninsured losses for weather-related disasters 
were estimated to be around $180 billion. At the same time, other forms of large-scale risk, such 
as terrorism, cyberattacks and pandemics are also increasing, with little financial protection to 
address the aftermath.
The social and economic resilience of a country, and its political stability, are dependent on the 
ability to recover from disasters. In the short-term, immediate post-crisis financial response is 
critical. Failure to provide a rapid injection of capital in response to disaster puts lives at risk. In 
Puerto Rico, the death toll of Hurricane Maria rose above 4,000, with one-third of the deaths being 
caused by delayed or interrupted medical care. In the longer-term, reconstruction of housing, 
infrastructure and businesses after a disaster is essential for recovery. Bridging the protection gap 
provides one way to underpin such financial recovery. 
Protection Gap Entities (PGEs): Marrying market solutions to social objectives. In their 
quest to address some of their social objectives in protecting their citizens from disaster, 
governments are increasingly turning to market solutions, such as innovative means of insuring 
for potential loss. They do so through the establishment of Protection Gap Entities (PGEs) that 
operate between state and market in developing novel solutions/schemes that mobilize global 
(re)insurance capital in addressing the aftermath of disaster.
This report draws on a large-scale research study of different PGEs around the world, in both 
developed and developing economies, to explain their role, their effects and their limitations in 
managing risk and alleviating the financial consequences of disaster. While such government 
interventions are growing, lessons need to be learnt about how to maximize their positive effects 
and guard against potential unintended consequences that can exacerbate the protection gap. 
This report shows the strategic implications of different types of PGEs, what they may be best used 
for, and how they can evolve to better help society and government to protect against the growing 
threats of natural and manmade disasters. 
Who should read this report? This report is useful for the different stakeholders involved in 
the work of PGEs: from policy makers and governments, to NGOs, to those running PGEs or 
insurance market organizations. These stakeholders often have very different interests and goals, 
which are reflected in the way they understand the purpose of PGEs and insurance. This report 
provides valuable insights into the common features of PGEs, and also examines some of their 
key differences, providing an opportunity for learning across stakeholders, PGEs, sectors and 
countries. 
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SECTION 1. Introduction
1.1 PROTECTION GAP ENTITIES
The challenges posed by the growing catastrophe insurance 
protection gap, particularly those of rebuilding in the aftermath 
of disaster, have prompted the generation of entities, which we 
label Protection Gap Entities (PGEs). These PGEs bring together 
market and non-market stakeholders in an effort to address 
the protection gap. They differ considerably in governance, 
political economies, points of origin, perils, and means of 
funding loss1,2,3(see Exhibit 1). Yet PGEs have the same  
broad goal: 
To transform uninsured risk into insurance-based products 
that can be transferred into global financial markets to provide 
capital for recovery following a disaster. 
This report examines the nature, characteristics and activities 
of PGEs. It provides information for the diverse stakeholders 
involved in some aspect of the work of PGEs, from policy 
makers to those running PGEs or depending upon them for 
financial products. These stakeholders often have very different 
understandings about the insurance market and the remit of 
their own and other PGEs. The report will therefore provide 
insights into the common features of these entities and some 
of their key differences, providing an opportunity for learning 
across stakeholders, PGEs, sectors and countries. 
In this section we first define the protection gap, and then 
provide an overview of some key common elements across the 
PGEs examined in our research study: the multiple and diverse 
stakeholders with whom they engage, the tension between 
the pursuit of market and social objectives that characterises 
these stakeholders, and the tension PGEs face between 
pursuing their mission strictly by developing financial products 
to ‘bridge’ the protection gap or expanding their remit to 
also ‘reduce’ the gap through improved physical resilience 
to disaster. This information provides the background for the 
analysis presented in this report. 
Examples of PGEs 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), a 
multi-sovereign risk pool set up to provide its member 
States with access to rapid capital for responding to the 
aftermath of natural disasters as diverse as tropical cyclone, 
earthquake, and excess rainfall.
California Earthquake Authority (CEA), a privately funded, 
publicly managed PGE set up to support the primary 
insurance market in providing earthquake insurance to 
Californian homeowners.
Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC), a terrorism 
reinsurance pool set up to provide reinsurance to insurance 
companies offering terrorism cover on commercial 
businesses in Australia.
1.2 THE PROTECTION GAP
The term ‘insurance protection gap’ refers to the gap between 
the insured and actual economic losses caused by large-scale 
catastrophic events. Some 70% of global losses from natural 
catastrophes are uninsured, equating to $1.3 trillion over 
the past 10 years.4 Indeed, uninsured natural disaster losses 
for weather-related risks are estimated to be around $180 
billion in 2017. Significant gaps in protection exist not only for 
natural disasters but also for other large-scale threats such as 
terrorism, cybercrime and epidemics. This gap is a problem in 
both developed and developing economies.
Impact. Economic resources are crucial in allowing societies to 
recover from devastating disasters. In the absence of adequate 
insurance, the burden of paying for losses falls largely on 
citizens, governments or aid organizations, with significant 
impact upon already straining government budgets, and 
economic and social hardship for those affected.5 
The growing exposure to disaster was shown in 2017; a very 
active year for natural catastrophes, with earthquakes, floods 
and hurricanes inflicting devastation on communities around 
the world. As Table 1.1 shows, the impact was particularly 
severe in developing economies. In these countries, where 
insurance penetration is typically low and governments 
and citizens have few financial reserves, losses from 
catastrophic disasters can devastate the economy, rolling back 
development gains for the country and exacerbating global 
inequality.6 Protecting the GDP is critical for such countries, 
which are more vulnerable, proportionally, to the losses from 
large-scale events than developed economies. 
Section 14
Region Economic losses Insured losses Protection Gap
in USD bn in USD bn % of economic 
loses
in USD bn % of economic 
loses
Latin America & Caribbean 31.6 5.1 16.1% 26.5 83.9%
Africa 2.9 0.8 27.6% 2.1 72.4%
Asia 31.2 5.0 16.0% 26.2 84.0%
North America 244.2 119.1 48.8% 125.1 51.2%
Europe 23.7 12.0 50.6% 11.7 49.4%
Table 1.1 The Protection Gap in developing and developed economies, 2017
Under-insurance is also a concern for developed economies.4,8 
While the insurance market is developed in these economies, 
the protection gap is also increasing.4 Such countries typically 
have high-value assets and infrastructure that, when under-
insured, contribute to a wide protection gap. For example, 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey only some 20% of 
eligible domestic properties in Texas and Louisiana had flood 
insurance.9 Hence, despite their relative economic strength, 
citizens, businesses and governments in such counties 
also suffer devastating losses that contribute to increased 
inequality in the aftermath of a disaster, as shown in Table 1.1.
Specifying the protection gap. While the protection gap is 
a global problem, affecting all countries, and referring to the 
whole uninsured population, the uniform use of the term is 
problematic. Typically, states and markets direct their efforts 
to address the protection gap at specific and local protection 
gaps, rather than aiming to solve the overall problem of under-
insurance. We will see examples in this report of such different 
protection gaps as: a lack of reinsurance capital available to 
insurers who write terrorism cover for city-centre business 
districts; insufficient emergency capital reserves in developing 
economies to maintain essential services after natural disaster; 
or unaffordable premiums for homeowners in highly exposed 
flood plains, or in earthquake-prone regions (even in mature 
insurance markets). 
The protection gap as a generic term refers to all uninsured 
risk, but the initiatives attempting to address the protection 
gap are specific to particular social, political or economic 
problems caused by under-insurance in a region. In this report, 
therefore, we either specify “the global protection gap” or we 
use the term “protection gap” in relation to specific social, 
political or economic problems in a region, which may be 
addressed by insurance.
1.3 STAKEHOLDERS OVERVIEW 
The existence of a protection gap shows, by definition, that 
market mechanisms alone are failing to protect against 
the specific peril involved. This prompts governments and 
inter-governmental organizations to intervene in the market, 
and generate some form of PGE. These PGEs draw together 
government, market and non-market stakeholders with 
different expertise and interests relevant to the specific 
protection gap problem. They may include:
Insurance market stakeholders: In markets for risk, such 
as flood and terrorism, insurers accept the responsibility 
for paying claims for post-disaster reconstruction in return 
for a premium. Some part of these insurer’s risk of payout is 
transferred to reinsurers and other capital providers through 
a range of financial products. Insurers pay a premium to these 
capital providers, who in exchange pay a share of the large-
scale claims incurred by the insurers following a disaster. 
Reinsurance capital therefore allows insurance companies to 
remain solvent after major claims events. This risk transfer is 
facilitated by reinsurance brokers. As procuring agents, they 
support the transfer of both capital and information amongst 
these parties, helping to make these high-value, highly-
complex deals work. 
Modellers: Catastrophe models are used to estimate the 
likelihood and severity of financial loss from catastrophes 
before they occur. Modellers in academia, government and 
industry provide analyses that inform the sophisticated 
mathematical and computing models used to understand and 
price the risks being transferred. Their work on the impact of 
disasters can also inform improved resilience to disaster. 
Government: Central government has political, social and 
economic reasons to protect its citizens. Its engagement as 
a stakeholder usually takes place through various entities, 
including its Financial Ministries, which aim to protect the 
government balance sheet; and its Environmental and 
Agricultural departments, which promote disaster mitigation 
and resilience. Government is a key stakeholder in the 
protection gap problem and usually initiates the development 
of a PGE. Often, government departments are gatekeepers of 
fragmented, but crucial data for understanding disasters. 
Inter-governmental organizations: Given the global and 
interconnected nature of the protection gap problem, inter-
governmental organizations can promote mutual interests 
across countries in dealing with disasters. Developmental 
Banks (e.g. World Bank) and International Development 
Organizations (e.g. the UK’s Department for International 
Development – DFID) are key actors that bring together 
countries, particularly in the developing world, through 
PGEs that develop market-based mechanisms to narrow the 
protection gap. 
Adapted from Swiss Re Institute 4,7
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Many of these various stakeholders are to some extent already 
interdependent, in ways which will shape the activities of the 
PGE in which they participate – but the PGE’s activities will in 
turn modify those interdependencies.
1.4 SOCIAL AND MARKET IMPERATIVES 
These various stakeholders are characterised by a mix of 
differing market and social objectives.
Governments tend to have a socially-focused understanding 
of the problem, with an objective to protect their citizens and 
communities from disasters: “Government’s role is to protect its citizens and its communities. We have a social responsibility 
with the local population. At the end this is our main mandate; 
to support them.” (Government Stakeholder)
The (re)insurance industry stakeholders have a market-focused 
understanding of the problem, with market objectives that can 
often clash with the social objectives. For example, insurers 
charge premiums that reflect the risk they take and thus for 
high-risk areas they charge a market price that is often high 
enough to make insurance unaffordable:
“Financially it doesn’t make sense [to provide low price insurance cover for high-risk areas]. I do get the social thing 
and there’s a responsibility and a concern for the industry. 
Affordability is always a concern for the industry but at the 
same time, we’re publicly listed companies, we are not charities. 
We have shareholders, so we have to charge an appropriate 
premium.” (Market stakeholder)
PGEs are often formed through joint action between the 
government and/or intergovernmental organizations on 
the one side; and various market organizations on the 
other. Their mandate often requires them to pursue ‘social’ 
objectives through market means. PGEs sit at the nexus of a 
range of stakeholders, often coordinating or combining these 
market and social objectives. Therefore, the creation of PGEs 
introduces a new type of actor, operating on a market basis but 
with a clear social mission.
1.5 BRIDGING AND REDUCING THE GAP
When formed, a PGE’s primary mandate is to provide the 
capital to support recovery following a disaster. Such initiatives 
help bridge the protection gap by providing financial solutions. 
However, if financial solutions lead purely to reconstruction 
of what was destroyed, they leave the underlying vulnerability 
unchanged. Therefore, PGEs social objectives often push them 
to attempt to reduce the gap by reducing vulnerability through 
more resilient forms of building and other initiatives. PGEs thus 
often face a tension between these two ways of addressing 
a protection gap - by bridging it (finding insurance solutions 
with greater reach than the existing ones) or by reducing it (risk 
reduction through either removing risk or bringing more risk 
within tradable range).
1.6 REPORT MAP
The report is structured in 7 sections and an appendix. 
Section 1 is the introduction of this report (current section).
Section 2 outlines PGE origination, in which multiple 
stakeholders must come together with their different interests. 
Three objectives of PGEs are introduced, alongside examples 
of how PGEs pursue them. How PGEs evolve in relation to 
these objectives, and the key challenges which commonly 
arise in pursuit of them is then discussed. 
Section 3 is about PGEs in developed economies with mature 
insurance markets. It presents a Protection Gap Strategic 
Response Framework that can be used to differentiate PGEs 
according to the way they intervene in the market for risk. 
We identify the pros and cons of three different types of PGE 
strategic positions in the value chain for risk transfer, providing 
a practical model for PGE design. 
Section 4 is about PGEs triggered by a desire to protect 
sovereign states, with fragile economies that are highly 
exposed to natural catastrophe, and where there is low 
insurance penetration. We explain how the particular  
demands of such economies for immediate capital to cope 
with crisis post-disaster has led to innovations in protection 
gap products. 
Section 5 discusses PGE contributions to disaster resilience. 
The PGE Resilience Framework is introduced to examine 
how PGEs can support key aspects of resilience. Areas and 
challenges that are beyond the direct control or influence of 
PGEs are discussed. 
Section 6 introduces the PGE Evolution Framework to identify 
key mismatches between different stakeholder interests, the 
evolving protection gap, and the remit of the PGE. Ways of 
resolving these mismatches are suggested.
Section 7 issues a call to arms to learn from and make  
better use of these already established PGEs to better 
understand and address the growing threat of natural and 
man-made disasters. 
The Appendix presents the methodology of the research study 
and a glossary with key terms used in this report. 
Section 26
SECTION 2. Origination and Objectives 
of Protection Gap Entities 
(PGEs) 
Despite the great variety of local circumstances,7,8 and the 
highly variable design and remit of the resulting PGEs, our 
research study has found that PGEs typically originate at the 
instigation of government in consultation with market players. 
They come about at their outset to fulfil objectives that fall into 
three categories. 
Objective 1: Resolve disruption in (re)insurance supply in 
mature markets; 
Objective 2: Mitigate the threat of unaffordable insurance 
in mature markets; 
Objective 3: Increase the financial viability of sovereign 
states with fragile economies. 
We find that these objectives not only shape the remit and 
strategies of the PGEs at their point of origin. They also act 
as anchors for the evolution of PGEs. While PGEs are typically 
established with a relatively narrow mandate to act on a 
specific local gap, some PGEs have evolved over time to tackle 
changes in the nature of their protection gap.
2.1  PGE ORIGINATION: AN ‘UNEASY’ TRUCE AMONGST 
STAKEHOLDERS
Government has a socio-political and often an economic 
interest in protecting its citizens and communities. When 
part of the society is not protected by the existing market 
mechanisms, it has the legislative power to bring about 
change. One course of action may be to set up a PGE to fulfil 
these public interests through the implementation of a market 
solution – finding a way to provide insurance. 
Establishing a PGE is inevitably a complex and sometimes 
protracted process, as can be seen in our case study of the 
formation of Flood Re in the UK. It requires negotiations 
between multiple stakeholders that have different world views, 
different technical understanding of risk, and crucially, different 
objectives – social and/or commercial. 
It can take many iterations to engineer what can be an ‘uneasy’ 
truce between these stakeholders into the founding remit of a 
PGE. However, only once it begins to operate will the different 
stakeholders really see how their interests are served by the 
PGE and its remit. As a result, the remit of the PGE may have to 
evolve; a recurrent theme in this report.
The origin of Flood Re: A ‘truce’ between state and 
market stakeholders
The autumn of 2000 was one of the wettest ever recorded 
in the United Kingdom and prompted a dialogue between 
the Government and the insurance industry about how 
to manage growing flood losses. Working through their 
professional body, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
the industry drew up a Statement of Principles (SoP) with 
Government to stabilize flood insurance provision. Under  
this agreement, existing insurer members of the ABI 
promised to continue insuring properties at high risk of 
flooding and the Government on its side would continue to 
invest in flood defences. 
The SoP was renewed in June 2008 to last until July 2013. 
After a Flood Summit in September 2010, three working 
groups comprising representatives from Government, the 
Environment Agency, the insurance industry and related 
organizations met regularly to try to agree key principles 
for a shared approach to managing flood risk, despite 
considerable scepticism about each other’s motivations.
In the move to austerity, government spending on flood 
defences had been reduced; a move that was not well 
received by insurers. At the same time, a two-tier insurance 
market had been created by the SoP, as new insurance 
companies entering the market did not have to insure 
properties in high risk flood areas, and so could adopt 
different strategies about which consumers to target. The 
SoP conditions were affecting the competitive state of the 
market. 
Over the following two years there were heated negotiations 
about the different government and industry objectives. 
Insurers preferred a free market where they could decide 
which risks made sense to trade commercially, and at what 
price. Government did not want high prices to be a deterrent, 
as they wanted to make sure that high-risk areas were 
covered by insurance. Yet they did not want to take any extra 
liability on the public purse. 
For insurers, there was the real threat that Government could 
legislate an obligation to provide flood insurance, while for 
Government, the threat of a free market could leave high-risk 
properties uninsured. Leaving a swathe of such properties 
uninsured was not good for the reputation of the insurance 
industry either, as an insurance stakeholder argued: “the 
incentive for us was reputational; we knew there was a 
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problem, the market wasn’t servicing these very high flood 
risk homes, so how could we deal with that, rather than just 
saying it’s too high a risk, we’re not going to insure you”. A 
solution had to be found. 
The insurance industry drew on modelling and data from 
insurers to understand the extent of the problem: how 
many homes were at high risk of flood? They also examined 
models for the setting up of a PGE, such as the California 
Earthquake Authority (CEA), National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP), and the UK terrorism pool. The Government 
proposed different options, not wanting to leave that task 
completely to the industry. After much push back from both 
sides, the compromise Flood Re model was agreed in 2014. 
Flood Re would be run by the insurance industry, supported 
by government legislation to levy all policyholders to fund 
the pool, and the Government would increase spending on 
flood defences. 
More working groups brought together the ABI, representing 
the industry, the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) for the legislation, and other insurance 
market parties such as modellers, brokers and reinsurers. 
The often messy elements of the emerging solution were 
presented to a committee of MPs, progressively establishing 
the legislation that would be passed as a Bill in UK 
parliament on 2015 – a full fifteen years after the start of 
discussions. Flood Re was born, and now had to execute  
its remit. 
2.2  OBJECTIVE 1: RESOLVE DISRUPTION IN (RE)INSURANCE 
SUPPLY IN MATURE MARKETS 
Extreme events which cause unexpectedly high losses can 
result in sudden large-scale disruption, or even failure, in the 
supply of (re)insurance for a specific peril. This is because:
a) unexpected large losses can jeopardize (re)insurers’ 
capital reserves and thus the ability to pay claims; and 
b) industry participants may lose confidence in their ability 
to quantify and manage exposure to such events. 
In such situations, insurers may stop offering policies so that 
citizens and/or business cannot get insurance cover. This 
disruption may be compounded when reinsurers stop offering 
capital to insurers to cover catastrophic losses; the result is 
insurers not being able to remain solvent to cover the risk of 
a large-scale loss themselves. For example, Pool Re in the 
UK was formed following the terrorist bombing of the Baltic 
Exchange in London, which disrupted the supply of insurance 
and reinsurance capital to cover terrorist attack on high-value 
commercial properties. 
Supply disruption in either the primary or secondary market 
translates into short-term disruption in the ability to transfer 
risk, and longer-term loss of trust in the market as a means to 
respond to disasters. Such disruption creates a socioeconomic 
crisis that may spur the establishment of a PGE whose 
objective is to restore supply as quickly as possible, as shown 
in the CEA case study (below).
The case of CEA: Solving the problem of supply
The 1994 Northridge 6.7 magnitude earthquake in southern 
California caused insured losses of $12.5 billion USD. This 
reportedly equated to more than 80 years of premiums for 
earthquake in California: a clear message to the market that 
existing earthquake pricing had not reflected the actual risk. 
Residential insurers in California were concerned about their 
ability to price correctly for earthquake risk, for two reasons: 
• They could not simply stop offering it because, since 
1986, it was (and remains) mandatory by California law 
to offer earthquake cover with all residential-property-
insurance policies. However, offerees are free to decline 
the offer, and lenders do not require earthquake cover as a 
condition of mortgage issuance. 
• California in 1988 enacted a new, strict, insurance-rate-
regulation law that dramatically restricted insurers’ ability 
to implement rates for personal lines insurance, such as 
home insurance. 
The effect of Northridge in 1994 on the primary home-
insurance market was rapid and severe: insurers simply 
withdrew, or severely restricted the availability of, new home-
insurance policies for any peril, not just earthquake. This 
market constriction eventually extended to almost 95% of 
the California home-insurance market. Californians requiring 
a new home-insurance policy were threatened with inability 
to insure new homes. 
A local protection gap for home insurance in California was 
created. While supply was disrupted, there was still strong 
demand, as homeowners could not get a mortgage without 
a home insurance policy in place. Although mortgagees 
did not, and do not, require mortgagors to buy earthquake 
insurance, they still required insurance on a range of perils 
beyond earthquake.
Faced with a severe crisis, the State of California, led 
by the insurance commissioner, worked with insurance 
markets and the state Legislature to find a solution. This 
led to the creation of the California Earthquake Authority 
(CEA), a privately funded, publicly managed, not-for-profit 
PGE to provide the earthquake cover written when a CEA 
participating insurer’s home-insurance customer accepts 
that insurer’s mandatory earthquake-insurance offer. 
Insurers pay a charge to participate in the CEA and then 
remain liable for a significant part of CEA earthquake 
losses. Participation in the CEA is not mandatory for 
insurers. Neither is it a mandatory purchase for renters or 
homeowners, who can buy a home-insurance policy without 
taking up earthquake cover at all. However, where an offer 
of CEA cover is taken up, CEA receives premiums which, by 
law, must be based on rates that reflect all actual costs of 
providing the selected insurance: actuarially sound rates. 
Currently, 80% of the insurance market participates in the 
CEA, while about 20% of residential earthquake insurance in 
California is still provided through the private market.
The CEA solved the 1994 Northridge-related supply problem 
of obtaining residential insurance in California, since it 
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directly enabled CEA participating insurers to come back to 
the market. CEA participating insurers could now provide 
the mandatory offer of earthquake cover, without having 
to be exposed to the full expense of providing the cover 
themselves. Residents could now buy home-insurance 
policies that enabled them to meet insurance requirements 
for new home-purchase mortgages. In this way, the very 
specific protection gap of home insurance was bridged. Yet 
the long-standing issue of an earthquake protection gap 
in California was unresolved. Even before the Northridge 
earthquake State-wide residential earthquake take-up was 
only some 25%. Despite the CEA’s best efforts, only about 
11% of households with home insurance in California today 
actually take up earthquake insurance. 
Despite concerted efforts to communicate to California 
residents the risks that are associated with earthquakes, the 
CEA has remained largely defined by its initial remit. It lacks 
effective powers to solve the low take-up of earthquake 
insurance itself and has not encouraged or proposed 
legislative changes such as mandatory take-up. 
Evolving gaps and evolving PGEs. PGEs such as the CEA or 
Pool Re were set up as an emergency response to a specific 
local protection gap, sometimes, like in CEA’s case, connected 
to but different from the catastrophe gap; sudden contraction 
in the supply of (re)insurance for a specific peril in a specific 
region, threatening key aspects of economic life. 
While PGEs such as CEA and Pool Re are often successful in 
solving the specific problem they were set up to address, they 
typically have to evolve, as the related protection gaps emerge 
and change over time. For example, as shown in the CEA case 
study, the CEA solved the supply problem of homeowner 
insurance in California but did not solve problem of earthquake 
under-insurance – a related, but ongoing protection gap. 
Terrorism PGEs around the world have also faced a change 
in the nature of their protection gap, as terrorism itself has 
evolved from ‘conventional’ terrorism (such as bombs), to 
what is termed CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear attack), to the increasing threat of cyberterrorism10 and 
the rise of small-scale attacks on citizens. These unmodeled 
and potentially catastrophic new risks have also been under-
insured by the market, so terrorism PGEs have had to evolve in 
order maintain (re)insurance supply.
Solving a temporary supply disruption or an evolving 
protection gap? PGEs established to meet Objective 1 aim to 
provide capital for a sudden gap in cover, in which existing 
demand for insurance is not being met. The PGE’s remit may 
(or may not, as in the case study of the CEA) be additionally 
intended to increase demand for insurance, or to grow 
protection in under-insured areas or for under-insured perils. 
Such a remit would imply a longer-term project rather than 
simply fixing the supply disruption. 
Furthermore, supply disruption may be temporary: for instance, 
as modelling improves, or the risk is reduced, it is possible that 
supply returns to the market. Alternatively, the gap in cover 
may evolve, to require new cover which is also in short supply 
(as in the case of terrorism). Either eventuality poses questions 
in relation to the long-term future of the PGE. Should the remit 
be limited to fixing the initial supply disruption, after which the 
PGE should wind down? Or should the remit have the flexibility 
to evolve alongside the protection gap itself? 
2.3 OBJECTIVE 2: MITIGATE THE THREAT OF 
UNAFFORDABLE INSURANCE IN MATURE MARKETS 
The combination of more frequent extreme weather events, 
high levels of urbanization in weather-exposed areas, and 
increasingly sophisticated risk modelling able to pinpoint risks 
at an ever-higher level of detail11 has resulted in a growing 
number of insureds in mature insurance markets falling into 
the “high-risk” category. Insurance products which are priced 
to reflect this high risk may ‘price out’ potential policyholders. 
The protection gap created by unaffordable insurance is a 
social problem. In the aftermath of disaster, for instance, social 
inequality is widened between those who were covered, and 
those who were not. Furthermore, the under-insured parts of 
society in high-risk areas may not be able to recover financially, 
unless recovery is met from the public purse. The public purse 
is, of course, not a neutral pot of money, but rather represents 
subsidization of the under-insured indirectly by taxpayers. 
Thus, while pricing constitutes a critical market mechanism, it 
also carries considerable social implications. 
Yet market pricing should also ensure that insurance 
companies remain solvent and continue to play their role 
in absorbing society’s risk. As the Northridge earthquake 
in California indicates, if insurers are not adequately 
compensated for the policies they provide, they risk financial 
collapse when losses need to be paid. Clearly, robust insurers 
that can pay claims are critical to the protection of their 
policyholders – another social implication of pricing. 
It is therefore important to address this problem effectively 
from both a market and social perspective. This explains why 
governments sometimes attempt to solve the problem by 
establishing PGEs that make insurance products affordable to 
those in high-risk areas. “Repeated exposure to risk means that the insurance products become unaffordable to citizens 
and consumers in developed economies, and so governments 
step in with different kinds of mechanisms to suppress pricing 
or spread pricing in such a way that disadvantaged citizens in 
high risk areas can continue to get insurance.”  (Inter-governmental stakeholder)
Lower prices for those at high risk may be counteracted 
by spreading the true cost of the highest risk cover across 
the wider pool of insureds. This may involve a range of 
mechanisms from mandatory insurance for all citizens to levies 
on lower-risk policies. Examples of such PGEs are Flood Re in 
the UK, the Earthquake Commission in New Zealand (EQC) and 
CCR in France, which latter, as a multi-peril PGE, can underpin 
insurance provision in highly-exposed areas across a range  
of risks. 
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PGEs that operate with this remit face the substantial challenge 
of not unwittingly creating larger problems. 
1. Suppressing market signals about high-risk areas: 
Increasing prices reflects high risk areas and gives an 
important market signal about the growing exposure to a 
particular peril in these areas. Suppressing such signals, 
by smoothing the price to make insurance affordable 
and available, does not discourage people from living in 
such areas where the frequency and severity of weather 
events is growing. Nor does it incentivize citizens and 
governments to increase resilience of the natural and built 
environment. 
 To counteract this problem, PGEs need to be part of an 
integrated solution to the problem of highly-exposed risk. 
This should include access to policy tools that enhance 
resilience, and discourage unsustainable behaviours. 
Examples are policies requiring properties that suffer 
repeated losses to be constructed in more resilient ways – 
such as building houses on stilts in flood areas – in order 
not to be excluded from the scheme. Flood Re in the UK 
goes further, excluding properties built after 2009 from the 
scheme to discourage subsidization of new developments 
in flood-prone areas.
2. Affordable insurance unconditionally? High-risk 
policyholders that can benefit from a PGE may range 
across a wide socio-economic spectrum. At one end of the 
spectrum are people of low socio-economic means, who 
do not have the capacity to move to safer places or afford 
high premiums. At the other end are those who have the 
socio-economic means, but who by choice live in desirable 
but highly risk-exposed areas, such as sea- and river-
fronts. Cross-subsidization of both types of policyholders 
may not be an equally desirable social objective.12 The 
potential for social and financial inequities and the 
related social and political discontent should be strongly 
considered when establishing PGEs schemes. 
Evolving gaps and evolving PGEs. In general, PGEs 
established as a response to the threat of unaffordable 
premiums for high-risk policy holders do address this 
protection gap, as there are specific mechanisms available 
to make insurance more affordable (see Section 3.1.2). 
In addition, where accompanied by mandatory insurance 
legislation, they can go a long way towards ensuring that 
all citizens receive at least some cover from catastrophes to 
which a country is particularly prone. This has been a particular 
success of the EQC. 
These PGEs also face a challenge to keep up with evolving 
protection gaps. They need to be watchful about unintended 
social/political consequences of their actions that may 
impact upon the protection gap; for example avoid distorting 
incentives so that the resilience of the natural and built 
environment in risk-prone areas is not compromised. Such 
actions might lead the protection gap to widen in new and 
initially unexpected directions.
2.4 OBJECTIVE 3: INCREASE THE FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF 
SOVEREIGN STATES WITH FRAGILE ECONOMIES 
PGEs are established to protect sovereigns in fragile 
economies that have high exposure to natural catastrophe, 
and where there is little insurance penetration. These PGEs, 
as shown by the following example of the Africa Risk Capacity 
(ARC), typically introduce insurance products designed to 
provide a rapid injection of capital in the immediate aftermath 
of a disaster, rather than to support reconstruction. These 
products are innovative in addressing a particular protection 
gap; the gap between a need for a rapid humanitarian 
response, such as providing food, clean water, or shelter after 
a disaster, and the capability of a sovereign in a low-income 
economy to meet those costs.
Mauritania is impacted by drought on a frequent basis. It was 
among the first countries to purchase an insurance policy from 
ARC for an estimated premium of $1,394,000 for a total cover 
of $9,000,000 for the agricultural season from July through 
November 2014. The product worked. After a very poor 
rainy season, Mauritania received a payout of approximately 
$6,326,000 in January 2015. They were able to use the rapid 
payment to alleviate a humanitarian crisis, providing 50,000 
households with 50 kilograms of rice and 4 litres of oil each 
over 4 months (April – July 2015). The timeliness of the 
payout had a positive impact; protecting livelihoods, and also 
prevented migration and the distressed sale of livestock.13 
Countries like Mauritania are at risk of severe economic 
damage because of the combination of extreme and frequent 
weather events, low levels of resilience and increasingly high 
levels of public debt. This has resulted in two protection gaps 
in low-penetration insurance markets with fragile economies.3 
First, there is the disaster liquidity gap: the lack of capital in the 
immediate aftermath of disaster to provide essential services 
whilst awaiting the arrival of humanitarian aid. Second there is 
the reconstruction gap: the lack of capital to pay for properties 
and infrastructure to be rebuilt. It is inevitable in such countries 
that the funds for reconstruction after a disaster will need 
to come from international aid.14 However, at the point of 
catastrophe, immediate disaster relief is a priority requiring 
relatively small funds - and that cover can be a viable and 
affordable product for a PGE to support.
Governments, inter-governmental organizations such as the 
World Bank, and, increasingly, aid organizations are therefore 
turning to various forms of disaster-liquidity insurance for 
low-income countries. Some of these efforts have resulted in 
the establishment of PGEs, including both multi-country risk 
pools such as the African Risk Capacity (ARC), the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Pacific 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company (PCRIC); and single-
country entities, such as FONDEN in Mexico. In all of these 
PGEs, sovereign states pay a premium to purchase insurance 
products that are backed up with market capital, and which  
will provide an injection of capital immediately after a 
catastrophic event. 
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The insured is the state, not private citizens or businesses; 
and the state may use the payout for any post-disaster 
requirements, such as petrol for generators, payment of the 
civil service, or the relocation of citizens. The knowledge that 
their budget is protected in this way enables sovereigns to plan 
for disaster in advance,15 while the immediate timing of the 
payment at the point of the crisis is considered to reduce the 
longer-term humanitarian impact of the disaster.16
Evolving gaps and evolving PGEs. The PGEs operating in 
this area were set up with a very specific remit, focused on a 
particular protection gap afflicting sovereign states rather than 
private citizens or businesses, and providing capital liquidity 
rather than funding post-disaster rebuilding.i The countries 
involved often have little technical expertise in assessing 
vulnerability and exposure, and poor data availability – factors 
which relate to low insurance penetration (for more details see 
Section 4). These factors point PGEs towards a development 
trajectory, with a direct emphasis on developing knowledge 
and ability to model the peril; developing the ability to prepare 
for it financially; and improving national resilience. As risk-
modelling capabilities and financial literacy evolve in such 
contexts, a sovereign generally improves its ability to identify 
other insurable types of risk. PGEs play a key role in helping 
their country members understand both the protection gap 
itself, and how insurance-based products can incentivize the 
growth of financial and physical resilience to disasters. 
Objectives for PGEs:
1. Resolve disruption in (re)insurance supply in mature 
markets; 
2. Mitigate the threat of unaffordable insurance in mature 
markets; 
3. Increase the financial viability of sovereign states with 
fragile economies. 
Evolution of PGEs and protection gaps:
• PGEs should evolve their remit and operating mechanisms 
in parallel with the evolving nature of the protection gap 
that they are addressing 
2.5  BEYOND MARKETS: PGES’ ROLES IN FRAMING THE 
PROTECTION GAP DEBATE AND IN BUILDING EXPERTISE 
The previous sections have provided an analysis of PGEs’ roles 
in marrying socio-political interests with market mechanisms to 
bridge particular localised protection gaps. Their role includes 
enabling the market to continue to trade in particularly volatile 
or uncertain risks; suppressing price for high-risk insureds; and 
developing new markets and products, as well as establishing 
the conditions for the market to grow in economies with low 
insurance penetration.
PGEs’ roles in addressing the protection gap, however, goes 
beyond their direct market effects, to encompass the following 
effects on risk framing and developing expertise. 
Framing effect. PGEs come about through considerable 
work from a range of stakeholders, all of which have 
different objectives and interests in addressing a protection 
gap. Indeed, as we showed at the start of this Section, the 
establishment of any PGE will be an ‘uneasy truce’ at a moment 
in time between parties. Because of the process through which 
they are established, PGEs have a central position with direct 
ties to these multiple stakeholders. They thus become a critical 
point of interdependence between stakeholders.17 
As the effects of shifting population distributions, climate 
change, and rising inequality change the nature of exposure,11 
the interests and objectives of stakeholders’ shift. Being at the 
nexus of the stakeholders, PGEs become a centre for debate 
or informed dialogue amongst them. PGEs, therefore, become 
critical actors in framing an evolving understanding of the 
protection gap, such as what risks remain under-insured, how 
they might be addressed, and who should be responsible. 
As a result, even where they have been established as a 
temporary solution, PGEs tend to persist. For example, Pool 
Re, initially established to cover the risk of bomb blasts in 
the city of London, has, as explained above, been part of the 
evolving cover for new types of terrorist risks. As they align with 
the interests of different stakeholders over time they continue 
to evolve and to be part of the way that the protection gap is 
identified and defined within society. 
Expertise effect. PGEs need to trade risk that is either not 
insured, or would be priced out of affordability, according 
to the existing technical expertise in the market. A new 
understanding is needed in order to find a rationale on which 
to trade - and PGEs must therefore develop new technical 
expertise, or find and co-ordinate existing expertise which 
may not have been available to the market. For instance, 
as part of its initial remit, Flood Re needed to quantify the 
potential number of properties at severe risk of flood in the 
UK. This entailed combining existing technical expertise about 
UK flood peril from different parties including insurers, public 
databases, modelling companies and the Environment Agency. 
In another example, part of the mission of the Pacific 
Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) 
is to develop new technical expertise in understanding the 
earthquake and cyclone peril in the Pacific Ocean and quantify 
the potential loss from these perils for its sovereign-state 
members. 
“We had hazard data for small local areas. What we didn’t have was nationwide hazard information and exposure data. 
The data that countries and inter-governmental organizations 
had wasn’t sufficient to do the work. Initial modelling showed 
that the data [even when combined] wasn’t robust enough to 
explain the actual losses. That really made the push to look at 
how could we improve the data collection and modelling for 
the Pacific.” (PGE stakeholder)
PGEs have an incentive and indeed, a unique position in 
filling a knowledge gap that often accompanies a protection 
gap. However, these activities have consequences for the 
i One exception is FONDEN, which also purchases a reinsurance product from the global market to cover the costs of reconstructing infrastructure.
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competitive dynamics of insurance markets. Technical 
expertise can be a source of competitive advantage for market 
players, since the ability to quantify and price risk is central to 
the ability to trade it. For example, private sector (re)insurers 
regard their modelling capability, and technical expertise in 
trading risk as one way in which they are better able to price 
risk and so, outperform their competitors. This has led to the 
development of a market in which data and models are usually 
owned and licensed within the private sector. In contrast, a 
PGE builds or expands a body of technical expertise with a 
view to trade risk that is under-insured or uninsured and hence 
not, initially at least, within the market. Its remit and interests 
are not necessarily profit-oriented, but aimed at increasing the 
spread of insurance for financial protection as a social good. 
Such interests might be served by promoting an open-sharing 
approach for its modelling capability in order to promote  
wider risk cover and enable more parties to bridge the 
protection gap.18
In these ways, PGEs can address barriers to knowledge 
sharing, overcome knowledge deficits and develop a ‘pre-
competitive’ space for technical expertise. However, they can 
also generate tensions between the open and proprietary 
nature of that technical expertise.
PGEs effects go beyond their direct effect on markets:
1. Framing effect: by being at the nexus of multiple 
stakeholders, PGEs have a generative role in framing 
the debate and evolving understandings about how to 
address the protection gap.
2. Expertise effect: PGEs generate new knowledge, and 
often make it publicly available as a social good. This 
might alter the distribution of expertise in the market, as 
well as the incentives for the development of expertise 
across the various stakeholders.
Section 312
SECTION 3. In the presence of a  
mature insurance market: 
Market dynamics 
PGEs typically show considerable variation in governance 
structures (e.g. public, private, partnership), risks covered (e.g. 
single peril or multi-peril), type of risk solution (e.g. product 
used) and their funding model (e.g. policy holders’ premiums, 
public or private levy).7,8,19 Indeed, these distinctions are often 
so particular to the point of origin and the national political 
economy that we may ask: what can we learn from the study of 
PGEs, and what can they learn from each other? 
We have found that PGEs have important common underlying 
principles on how they respond, strategically, to the protection 
gap. When PGEs operate in developed economies (Objectives 
1 & 2 in Section 2), they must sit alongside the established (re)
insurance market. This raises critical strategic issues: 
• Types of market intervention: how they share risk with the 
existing market players 
• Positions in the value chain: where they sit within the value 
chain for risk transfer
Classification of PGEs by their strategic choices
Types of market intervention: 
• Removing risk
• Redistributing risk
• Combining risk removal and risk redistribution 
Positions in the value chain: 
• Insurer PGE
• Reinsurer PGE
• Market Capture PGE
3.1  PROTECTION GAP STRATEGIC RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK: TYPES OF MARKET INTERVENTIONS
Our research study shows that PGEs emphasize primarily either 
1) removing risk, or 2) redistributing risk as their key means of 
market intervention (see Figure 3.1). 
3.1.1 Removing risk
This risk refers to a market intervention in which risk is 
removed from the market onto the balance sheet of the PGE 
or the Government (vertical axis, Figure 3.1). This is particularly 
likely for risk that is seen as too volatile or extreme for the 
market to take, such as the threat of what is termed non-
conventional or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
(CBRN) terrorism, where the potential losses are beyond 
Figure 3.1. Protection Gap Strategic Response 
Framework
the capacity or risk appetite of the market. A high position 
on this dimension would represent a PGE fully removing 
the risk of CBRN terrorism from the market. In this scenario, 
insurance companies may accept premiums from insureds 
for CBRN terrorism risk, so ensuring policies can still be 
issued. However, they then pass the entire percentage of that 
premium associated with CBRN terrorism risk to the PGE. The 
PGE can then provide the cover because it has access to some 
government guarantee (limited or unlimited) to pay for losses.ii 
While the extreme position on this dimension is removing 
the risk fully from the market, responses may also vary along 
the continuum, by removing only some of the most extreme 
risk. For example, a PGE might remove a ‘top layer’ of risk as 
defined by market signals such as high price, or withdrawal 
of insurance supply, while risk below a certain threshold is 
retained by primary insurers in the usual way.
ii While the specific policy by which the risk is removed may indicate some future levying of higher premiums on the insurance market and policyholders to recover 
some future government costs, the actual mechanism is to remove the risk altogether in the first instance.
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Risk removal to a PGE is an effective way to maintain supply, 
particularly in the face of sudden market withdrawal from 
extreme and highly volatile risk (see Objective 1 in Section 2). 
When there is no market appetite to provide cover, and yet 
there remains commercial demand for an insurance product 
such as nuclear terrorism cover, removing that most volatile 
risk allows market operations on less volatile risk to be 
restored, bringing back stability and security in a market. 
Challenges. The issue of what and how much risk to remove 
from the market is fraught with challenges. We draw attention 
to two unintended consequences that emerge when removing 
risk from the market: 
1. Weakening risk appetite of the market: PGEs that 
operate through risk removal are often set up to address 
an urgent crisis of undersupply. Under time pressure to 
find a solution, stakeholders tend to transfer all of the risk 
related to the specific peril to the PGE – even when some 
of the risk could still be traded by the market, at least when 
market conditions stabilize. However, without a deliberate 
policy to progressively return at least some of the risk to 
the market, the market might lose its appetite for that risk. 
Not trading the risk for a long time, can result in the market 
no longer having the necessary expertise and being 
reluctant to make the investment to develop it. 
 However, insurance markets exist to trade in risk. Exposure 
to risk helps them sharpen their knowledge, technical 
expertise and innovation for such risk. Removal of some 
risks (e.g. terrorism) or parts of such risks (e.g. particular 
flood-prone areas) may dull this competitive edge of 
the market for this specific peril. “I think the insurance industry has grown a little bit fat and lazy when it comes 
to [specified risk] because they’ve always seen it as [PGE’s] 
remit … They just basically said well I can sleep at night, I’m 
not taking that risk.” (PGE stakeholder). 
2. Skewing PGEs/ Governments to higher expected 
losses: If the PGE removes only the most volatile risk, 
allowing the market to continue trading by ‘cherry-picking’ 
the ‘easier’ or more profitable forms of risk, the PGE 
is essentially set up to absorb the problem of adverse 
selection in the insurance market. That is, the PGE takes 
the small body of highly exposed risk that does not yield 
sufficient volume or price to be profitable for the industry 
to trade. 
 However, if the PGE takes only the highly volatile or 
extreme risk, but does not also have access to the wider 
body of risk, with which to diversify its own exposure, then 
it has a portfolio skewed to higher expected losses that 
will be removed to the PGE and ultimately government 
balance sheet. This means that the taxpayer, through 
the government’s balance-sheet, will cover these higher 
expected losses for a) the purposes of allowing a market 
to continue to trade; and b) the protection of only a small, 
most exposed sector of society. Risk removal models thus 
raise critical questions about market subsidization and 
social fairness. 
These two challenges are a trade-off, since keeping all the risk 
within the PGE can dampen market appetite, whilst leaving 
some risk with the market can skew government exposure. 
Nonetheless, risk removal remains a key strategic response by 
which PGEs can address a protection gap, whilst still allowing 
the market to function. It can be an immediate response to a 
sudden supply failure (see Objective 1), after which PGEs can 
seek to scale down their position on the vertical axis in Figure 
3.1, gradually returning more risk to the market as the market 
problem rebalances. 
3.1.2 Redistributing risk
This refers to taking the risk of loss by a relatively small group 
of highly-exposed policyholders and redistribute it across the 
wider pool of variably-exposed policyholders (horizontal axis, 
Figure 3.1). It is typically used in situations where risk-reflexive 
pricing makes insurance unaffordable for policyholders in 
highly-exposed areas (see Objective 2 in Section 2). 
In this model, low-risk policyholders pay a slightly higher 
premium than what would truly reflect their risk, in order to 
subsidize an affordable premium for those who are highly 
exposed to risk. The PGE, typically formed as a pool, takes 
the premiums from all policyholders and uses the resultant 
revenue to redistribute and smooth pricing across all 
policyholders. 
Redistribution as a strategic response essentially uses the 
PGE to restore traditional models of insurance. Historically, 
insurance losses were less predictable, modelled in coarser 
detail, and so pricing could not accurately reflect the risk on a 
case-by-case basis. Rather, the premiums of the many, widely 
distributed across possible exposures, covered the losses 
of the few. Today, however, the plethora and granularity of 
available data on risk exposure, combined with improvements 
in risk modelling in mature insurance markets,20 has eroded 
these traditional ‘risk-sharing’ models of insurance. Properties 
that are most exposed to loss can be pinpointed and their 
policyholders charged individual premiums that more 
accurately reflect their specific risks. 
While such models better specify risk, they do not necessarily 
address the protection gap. Rather, as noted in Objective 
2, Section 2, they may widen it as some highly-exposed 
policyholders fall out of the pool of insureds. “But improved models for whom? We can identify an individual property and 
apply rating factors. Are we doing that to provide more cover? 
Why are we doing that?” (Industry stakeholder). 
PGEs that adopt the strategic response of redistributing risk 
attempt to ameliorate these ‘improvements’ in risk-reflexive 
pricing by artificially creating a wide pool of insureds, in which 
the premiums of the many can continue to cover the extreme 
losses of the few. However, they can only do so with some 
government legislation, typically supported by an underlying 
notion of collectivism in the underpinning national culture, that 
enables a levy on lower-risk properties to subsidize higher-
risk properties. Effectively the Government must legislate 
for a social objective to take some precedence over market 
objectives. 
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Challenges. Risk redistribution via a PGE is effective at 
counteracting the problems of highly-exposed actors falling 
out of the insurance nest. It can support high collective 
insurance coverage in a particular country or region, essentially 
bridging the underlying protection gap. However, it also comes 
with the following challenges.
1. Growth of high-exposure areas. Risk redistribution is 
predicated on a model of a large number of insureds, in 
which only a few are highly exposed. Take the example of 
flooding. We know that climate change and/or growing 
urbanization increases exposure to natural disasters such 
as flooding. This can result in very large or expensive 
areas being repeatedly flooded. In such a situation, the 
premiums of the many can no longer necessarily outweigh 
the losses of the few. 
2. Redistribution shifts focus away from risk mitigation. 
In addition, redistributing risk breaks the market chain 
of risk, reward and responsibility. Insurance risk models 
send a strong price signal that specific risk-prone areas 
are only viable to trade if rewarded with a high premium. 
However, the redistribution strategy can induce moral 
hazard in which those at the highest risk of repeated loss 
are not incentivised to reduce their risk, or change risky 
behaviours (for example, through structural changes to 
their property to mitigate the effects of flood), since they 
do not bear the full costs of their exposure. 
 More broadly, the market signal of high prices can be 
seen as the prompt to improve risk mitigation in risk-
prone areas, for instance through changes in planning 
permission to require improved methods of building in 
highly-exposed areas (see Section 5). Thus, bridging the 
protection gap through risk redistribution can not only 
suppress the price signal, but also direct attention away 
from risk mitigation as another means of reducing the 
protection gap. In these ways, risk redistribution can, in the 
long-term, exacerbate the very problem it was established 
to solve. 
3.1.3 Combination of risk removal and redistribution
Removing and redistributing risk are not necessarily either/
or responses. As indicated by Figure 3.1, PGEs can combine 
risk removal and risk redistribution, albeit not necessarily in 
equal measures, or on the same elements of risk. Rather they 
may take an approach where they remove some elements of 
risk and redistribute others. Often such changes occur in an 
evolutionary way. A PGE may initially be established to solve, 
for example, the problem of lack of supply for a very volatile 
risk, through a strategic removal response. Once supply begins 
to return, it might also employ some redistribution of risk. 
To better understand this strategic response, we present the 
case study of the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation 
(ARPC) – a PGE that uses this combination approach.
The case of ARPC: Evolving strategic responses to 
address a supply failure
The ARPC was formed in 2003 to address the limited capital 
supply for terrorism risk globally following the 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre. Coming relatively late in 
the formation of such pools, the Australian government and 
the insurance industry were able to examine and learn from 
many existing PGEs. Initially, the Terrorism Insurance Act 
was established, which addressed the problem of insurance 
supply by over-riding any terrorism exclusions in contracts of 
insurance covering ‘eligible’ property (as defined in the Act), 
requiring the insurance industry to pay insured policyholders 
for losses on eligible property if the Australian government 
declared a particular incident as a terrorist act. To this 
extent, terrorist insurance was thus mandatory for all insured 
policyholders because an insurance company would find 
themselves paying for terrorist losses by default, following a 
declared terrorist act, even if they did not deliberately offer 
such cover for eligible property. 
At the same time, the ARPC was set up with a remit to 
respond strategically by removing the risk of paying for 
terrorism losses in eligible policies from the insurance 
industry. Insurers pay ARPC a premium based on three broad 
tiers of risk, from highest premium in central city locations, 
to suburban, to lowest premium in rural areas. In return, 
they are given full removal of terrorism risk, since the ARPC, 
operating as a reinsurance company, would pay all the 
claims beyond the insurers’ retentions to a limited liability of 
$10 billion AUD. ARPC would meet these payments through 
its own capital reserve, the additional reinsurance it bought 
in global reinsurance markets as a retrocession product, 
and thereafter, from the government balance sheet, which 
guarantee the Australian government provides ARPC for  
a fee. 
While it is voluntary for insurance companies to purchase 
terrorism treaty reinsurance from ARPC, if they do choose 
to do so, they must transfer the risk for all eligible policies 
within their portfolio. Given the legislative situation in which 
they are liable for commercial property losses arising from 
terrorist attack, almost all of the insurance companies in 
Australia have taken up the option to transfer their terrorism 
risk to the APRC. This approach thus not only uses risk 
removal as a strategic response but, because insurance 
companies are required to transfer the risk across all of their 
eligible policies in Australia, was also a risk redistribution 
strategic response. Specifically, those at low risk of terrorism 
loss cross-subsidized the highest threats, resulting in a 
diversified pool of insured commercial risk across higher and 
lower threats around the country.
The ARPC was set up with a remit to remain relevant to 
problems of market supply through a three-year legislative 
review process. At these reviews, the ARPC has consistently 
evolved to both widen the definition of which properties 
might be defined as eligible under the Act. For example, 
at the 2015 review the definition of commercial use of a 
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property was expanded to include mixed-use residential and 
commercial buildings in which at least 20% of the property 
has a commercial use and all buildings with a sum insured 
value of $50 million or more. 
At the same time, ARPC has scaled down the level of risk 
removal, by pushing insurers to retain more of the risk of 
terrorism losses on their own balance sheet to a specified 
threshold that is aggregated across the industry. This amount 
of retention has grown progressively from an initial threshold 
of $150 million AUD to $200 million, as an aggregated 
industry loss, from July 2018. The maximum retention for 
individual insurance companies has increased from $10 
million AUD to $12.5 million AUD. 
In scaling down risk removal, the ARPC is thus working 
to address the problem of industry supply, by working 
with the primary insurance industry to help them supply 
some terrorism insurance from their own balance sheets. 
At the same time, because ARPC buys reinsurance cover 
itself, it has brought reinsurance capital to the market, 
further addressing the problem of capital supply. Yet the 
government balance sheet remains available for losses 
above the industry appetite to supply capital. 
Hence, a combination of risk removal and risk redistribution, 
evolving within a legislative framework of three-year 
reviews have ensured that the ARPC continues to evolve 
in consultation with its stakeholders in government and 
industry, and the wider needs of Australian society. 
PGEs typically start with a removal or a redistribution approach 
in response to any particular type of protection gap. For 
instance, a PGE might fully remove a risk after a market shock 
when supply fails, but then gradually return risk to the market 
as the market’s understanding and appetite return. Or a PGE 
might introduce risk redistribution in highly risk prone areas, 
but then gradually reduce risk redistribution as risk mitigation 
efforts in such areas progressively make insurance premiums 
affordable again.
Ideally, PGEs would have flexibility along both axes of Figure 
3.1. They should be able to scale up removal after a major 
shock in which insurance industry supply in a particular region 
or on a particular peril is disrupted. Conversely, they should be 
able to scale up redistribution where overall capacity within a 
region is robust, despite some highly-exposed pockets of risk. 
A combination approach is potentially very efficient for PGEs 
that have a portfolio of different types of risks. Multi-peril 
PGEs, such as CCR, can take different approaches to perils, 
emphasising risk removal on some risks and risk redistribution 
on others, according to the available modelling capability and 
market appetite for each risk.
Challenges. The main challenge for the combination approach 
is how to move between the axes of Figure 3.1 – usually from a 
starting position wholly on either the removal or redistribution 
axis. Critically, there needs to be a highly-flexible approach 
to the role and remit of the PGE. A combination approach, 
particularly one in which removal and redistribution on 
any particular risk may be scaled up or down, necessitates 
an adaptable and even nimble approach to legislation 
and governance, in which multi-party dialogue between 
stakeholders remains open. 
3.1.4 Summary: evolving remit or mission creep? 
As Figure 3.1 suggests, risk removal and risk redistribution 
are different strategic responses that a PGE may take to the 
management of a specifically identified local protection gap. 
However, they should not be seen as static positions. There 
is no ‘ideal type’ of strategic response. Rather, as the nature 
of the protection gap, and the interdependencies between 
the key stakeholders evolves, the strategic response of a PGE 
needs to evolve to meet the multiple demands upon it. 
While PGEs are well placed to develop new responses as risk 
evolves, they also need to be at the heart of continuously-
evolving legislation and multi-party dialogue to manage the 
multiple different interests involved in bridging the protection 
gap. Hence, strategic responses are not simply technical issues 
about approaches to risk transfer. Rather, a key feature of PGEs 
is the need for high competencies in managing the social and 
political economy within which approaches to risk transfer 
need to evolve. In particular, PGEs need to balance tensions 
between demands for an evolving remit and fears that this may 
lead to “mission creep” that distorts the competitive market.
3.2  MARKET EFFECT: STRATEGIC POSITIONS IN THE  
VALUE CHAIN
To bring market solutions to socio-politically defined 
problems, PGEs intervene in the traditional value chain for 
risk transfer (see Figure 3.2). We now explain three possible 
strategic positions that they may occupy. These positions are 
archetypes, meaning that they illustrate general characteristics 
of occupying that space in the value chain. The reality of any 
particular PGE, as explained in our case examples, may differ 
slightly from the archetype. We address the implications of 
each archetype in terms of competitive effects, challenges, and 
what that type is ‘Best For’.
Figure 3.2. Value chain for risk transfer
Insureds
Primary  
market  
Insurers
Secondary 
market 
Reinsurers
Government 
Insurer of  
last resort
3.2.1 Strategic position 1: The ‘Insurer’ PGE
PGEs can act as an insurer operating in the primary market to 
provide policies on a particular risk that is no longer covered 
by the market (Objective 1); or one for which cover has become 
unaffordable for those highly exposed to the risk (Objective 2). 
As shown in Figure 3.3, this means that they provide insurance 
policies directly to insureds in return for a premium. They  
also buy reinsurance from the private market to cover their  
risk exposure.
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Figure 3.3. Strategic position 1: Insurer PGE
Insureds
PGE
Primary 
market 
Insurers
Secondary 
market 
Reinsurers
Government 
Insurer of  
last resort
Examples of the Insurer PGE archetype are EQC, CEA, and NFIP. 
This position is typically taken by PGEs offering homeowner 
policies and has two main strategic implications: 
Co-opetition in distribution. Typically, Insurer PGEs develop 
their own insurance policies on the risk they deal with and offer 
them to policyholders via traditional insurers. Homeowners 
often buy their insurance as a ‘bundled’ product that covers 
them from the risk of fire, flood, or earthquake, alongside 
other perils. Such policies provide a catch-all of potential 
risks and, usually, provide the necessary protection of assets 
to underpin a homeowner’s mortgage. When an Insurer PGE, 
like CEA in California, intervenes in the value chain to bridge 
a local protection gap, then a proportion of the homeowners’ 
insurance cover, namely earthquake cover in California, can be 
provided through the PGE. 
There are situations, as in California with earthquake, when the 
particular cover for this peril can still be provided by traditional 
insurers or they can choose to attach CEA’s cover to their 
homeowners’ insurance product. Policyholders then select 
whether they buy the PGE cover, the private market cover, or, 
if purchasing cover is not mandatory, do not buy any policy 
for that particular peril. However, in other situations the cover 
for a peril is provided exclusively by the PGE. This means that 
the Insurer PGE essentially replaces traditional insurers for this 
particular cover. For example, the New Zealand Earthquake 
Commission (EQC) provides the earthquake component of all 
homeowner insurance policies to a particular threshold and 
receives a percentage of the premium charged on  
those policies. 
This position in the value chain involves collaboration between 
insurers and the Insurer PGE. The insurer can continue to 
provide comprehensive cover through a bundled product 
to policyholders, with the help of the PGE that takes some 
risk, usually the most volatile, or most exposed. At the same 
time, there is also an element of indirect competition as they 
both occupy the same position in the value chain and the 
PGE provides a product for which the private market might 
otherwise develop risk appetite to supply. This mixing of 
collaboration and competition is usually known as  
co-opetition. 
Risk-reward-responsibility effects. While distribution via 
insurance companies is efficient, a potential problem arises. 
Since insurers don’t take the risk, don’t get the premium 
(reward) and also don’t pay the claims (responsibility) for the 
proportion of the policy that is provided by the Insurer PGE, 
they are not incentivised to compete to sell more of the cover, 
and thus ensure take-up of the PGE’s percentage of the policy.
In addition, after an event, a key feature of the insurance value 
chain is that capital flows to the insurers to pay claims. One 
of the key functions of primary insurers is to assess damage 
in order to manage the effective payment of claims for which 
they are responsible. However, again, unless there is a specific 
mandated requirement for primary insurers to assess loss, 
in order for the PGE to pay claims, or the PGEs develop their 
own apparatus for loss adjustment and payment of claims, the 
direct chain of responsibility for accurate risk assessment and 
distribution of payments is also disrupted. 
While not insurmountable, both elements indicate how  
Insurer PGEs affect the relationship between risk, reward  
and responsibility.
Best For. The Insurer PGE archetype is best for ensuring 
personal lines cover to citizens where a region is heavily 
exposed to a key peril, such as earthquake or windstorm. 
It can ensure that all members of a society have access to 
homeowner cover that could otherwise be unaffordable for 
some. It may be particularly effective for the risk redistribution 
strategic response explained in Section 3.1, especially where 
cover is either mandatory, or required by lending institutions in 
order for policyholders to obtain a mortgage. 
3.2.2 Strategic Position 2: The ‘Reinsurer’ PGE
PGEs can act as a reinsurer operating in the secondary market. 
In this scenario, insurers operate as normal in the market, 
providing insurance products. However, they then transfer that 
proportion of risk specifically identified as a protection gap, 
such as the risk of flood or terrorism, to the PGE. In the event of 
a loss, the PGE provides the capital to pay the claims against 
the insurance policies for that particular proportion of the risk. 
Some examples of this archetype are Flood Re in the UK, ARPC 
in Australia, and CCR in France. 
Figure 3.4. Strategic position 2: Reinsurer PGE
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Insurers
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last resort
This position in the value chain has the following strategic 
implications: 
Preserving the primary market. The Reinsurer PGE 
intervenes in the value chain to preserve the ability of the 
primary market to trade in two ways: 
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1. It can address a supply failure in the secondary market 
(see Objective 1) by removing risk from the market 
(Section 3.1.1) to the PGE. The Reinsurer PGE provides 
the necessary reinsurance capital that the primary market 
needs to continue trading if the traditional secondary 
market withdraws capital after a shock, or has insufficient 
capacity for the scale of the risk. The Reinsurer PGE may 
itself buy a retrocession product from the reinsurance 
market, as indicated in Figure 3.4 by the presence of 
the secondary market in the chain; and/or it may have 
access to a government balance sheet to underpin its own 
exposure (e.g. Pool Re). 
2. When insurance premiums become unaffordable 
 (see Objective 2) the Reinsurer PGE can act as a  
price-smoothing mechanism by redistributing risk  
(Section 3.1.2). 
a. The Reinsurer PGE may act as the ‘transformer’ of price 
differences, where it takes all of the personal lines 
risk from the primary market, acting as the dominant 
reinsurer. It essentially smooths the reinsurance price 
by pooling all risks, of high and low exposure, for a 
nation, endeavouring to ensure the overall reinsurance 
premium received is sufficient to cover the overall 
national exposure. In doing so, it is able to offer lower 
reinsurance premiums to the primary market, since 
it needs only to cover its own diversified exposure, 
without concern for profit, or higher premiums to offset 
the potential volatility of any one primary insurer. It 
thus enables primary insurers to also smooth their 
own pricing of personal lines in highly-exposed areas 
because they can transfer such risk at a lower price to 
the Reinsurer PGE (e.g. CCR).
b. Alternatively, only the most highly-exposed risk may be 
transferred from insurers to the PGE. In this scenario, 
insurers usually charge a below-market price that is 
affordable for policyholders. These premiums, for this 
highly-exposed risk, are passed on to the PGE, which 
is then liable for the claims against that risk. To afford 
the payout for those claims, the PGE has to receive a 
subsidy from insurers, levied on all policyholders, that 
becomes its capital reserve to cover the high risk of 
loss in the PGE portfolio (e.g. Flood Re in the UK). Here, 
the Reinsurer PGE operates a risk-sharing mechanism 
between its own balance sheet and the primary market 
through the levy, but can also use other forms of risk 
transfer mechanism, such as buying a retrocession 
product and/or transferring risk to the Government, to 
manage its own exposure. 
In all cases, the primary market is enabled to continue trading 
in risk, whilst being able to transfer that proportion of risk, 
which comprises the basis of an identified protection gap, to 
a Reinsurer PGE as the secondary market. The introduction of 
a Reinsurer PGE, providing ample reinsurance cover for less 
attractive (or new) risks, can also enable primary insurers to 
obtain new business that will expand the market. This means 
that insurers can underwrite new policies, which as a result can 
narrow the local protection gap. 
Competitive effects in the secondary market. The Reinsurer 
PGE has access to a pool of primary risk that might otherwise 
be transferred to reinsurers, particularly as their appetite for 
that risk evolves. If reinsurers have appetite but are restricted 
from accessing primary market risk, because it all goes to the 
PGE, it may be unclear whether the PGE necessarily offers the 
best price, since the effects of competition in driving down 
price will be restricted. Thus, regulatory oversight is needed to 
ensure that the PGE is not acting as a monopoly for primary 
market risk that is anti-competitive to the secondary market, or 
that drives up prices. 
One way this can be managed is if the Reinsurer PGE acts as an 
aggregator for individual highly-exposed primary market risk, 
and then transfers part of this risk to the secondary market. 
As with Flood Re in the UK, the secondary market can both 
directly access flood risk from primary insurers and also access 
flood risk from the PGE. 
Best For. As discussed in Section 3.1, PGEs can scale 
up or down their strategic responses of risk removal and 
risk redistribution, in line with the changing nature of the 
protection gap. While such strategic flexibility necessitates 
a skilful coordination of the interdependencies among 
stakeholders, who may have conflicting interests, the 
Reinsurer PGE can be an effective archetype for responding 
to fluctuations in (re)insurance capital, because of its position 
between the primary and secondary market. 
For instance, after a market shock caused by a big catastrophe, 
there may be a shortage of reinsurance supply in the market. 
At this point, the Reinsurer PGE can facilitate risk removal by 
scaling up to take more risk from the primary market, which 
it can hold, or pass directly to the government balance sheet 
following shortage of supply. At other times, when primary 
and/or secondary markets recover their risk appetites, the 
Reinsurance PGE can scale down its own share, effectively 
increasing primary market retention and passing more risk to 
the secondary market (e.g. ARPC or Pool Re). In this way it can 
enhance risk redistribution across the entire value chain. 
3.2.3 Strategic Position 3: The ‘Market Capture’ PGE
This type of PGE ‘captures’ risk throughout the value chain, 
operating in both the primary insurer and the secondary 
reinsurer spaces, and also accessing the government balance 
sheet. It can act as a primary insurer for all, or at least most, 
risks in a country, either alongside traditional insurers as an 
additional product, or by ‘co-insuring’ on existing products with 
the primary market insurers, to support the market’s ability to 
provide cover to and pay claims. 
Because the PGE holds all premium transferred over many 
risks on a national level, it has a highly diversified portfolio 
that enables it to optimize its capital reserves.21 Essentially 
premium generated across the portfolio can pay for losses in 
one part of the portfolio. Hence, the Market Capture PGE does 
not necessarily need to purchase reinsurance but can choose 
instead to act as its own reinsurer, due to the benefit of a 
diverse portfolio of risks that lowers the overall exposure to 
losses. This type of PGE is typically a public-sector organization 
with access to the government backstop to secure its balance 
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sheet above the capital reserves it can amass through its 
privileged access to the primary market. 
Figure 3.5. Strategic position 3: Market Capture PGE
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This archetype has the following strategic implications:
Comprehensive national protection. This type of strategic 
response can be very effective when a consistent national 
approach exists to provide the most comprehensive cover to 
all citizens at an affordable price. This presupposes that most 
citizens are insured, typically through some mandatory form 
of cover, and that any private sector insurance companies are 
co-opted into sharing cover with the public-sector PGE. This 
way, the Market Capture PGE enables the risk redistribution 
element of protection at the primary level, whilst enabling risk 
removal from the private-sector elements of the market at the 
secondary level. 
In effect, this is a means of mutualizing risk cover on a national 
level to address the protection gap, albeit not necessarily 
by transferring it to a market.22 In such situations, the 
mutualization acts as a price-smoothing mechanism, which 
may lower overall cost of cover to individual policyholders.22 
Crowding out private sector provision of catastrophe 
insurance. The strength of this strategic response in 
providing comprehensive national cover may also bring 
about unintended effects, primarily in deterring private sector 
insurers from offering products in the catastrophic-risk market. 
This occurs in two ways. 
1. The primary market may lose its competitive or market 
interests. We refer to this effect of this type of PGE strategy 
as ‘market capture’ with a nod to the concept of ‘regulatory 
capture’.23 When market parties operate in a context 
where the Market Capture PGE is dominant, they can 
end up relying on the PGE to take the majority of volatile 
risk, lose or never develop expertise in trading that risk, 
and therefore lose appetite for such risks. Indeed, the 
market players may see this as in their own best interests 
to protect their balance sheets. This might happen even 
where there are governance structures in place to ensure 
that the PGE responds to changes in risk appetite in the 
industry, and even where the two parties may feel they 
have independently negotiated their positions. While, 
as noted above, this may have benefits, the flipside is 
that it dampens the risk appetite and competitive edge 
of market players in ways that may stifle market-based 
innovation. For example, primary level players do not have 
to worry about calculating the risk-reward-responsibility 
relationship in measuring their exposure, pricing policies, 
and purchasing risk transfer. The risk and responsibility 
of paying for that risk is carried anyway by the national 
provider. They are therefore not incentivized to improve 
their risk modelling and pricing mechanisms in order to 
gain a competitive edge. 
2. A national barrier to competition at the secondary 
market level exists. The Market Capture PGE does not 
need to access reinsurance, due to its comprehensive 
access to wide diversification, underpinned by a 
government guarantee. At the same time, the international 
reinsurance market cannot offer cover directly to the 
primary market, because the primary market trades solely 
with the nationally-owned PGE. While this is beneficial 
from the perspective that the cost of buying reinsurance 
is avoided, it also hinders the inflow of capital from global 
markets to pay for national losses. 
Best For. The Market Capture PGE effectively nationalizes 
the insurance market. It is the best for a country wishing to 
use insurance-based mechanisms to provide comprehensive 
cover for its citizens, and to control the pricing of that cover. It 
is thus effective where cover is largely compulsory and where 
the primary aim of the PGE is to bridge the protection gap by 
ensuring that citizens have the maximum access to widespread 
cover. It is particularly suitable for political economies and 
historical contexts in which there is a nationalised approach to 
public goods and facilities. 
An example of the Market Capture PGE is the Spanish 
Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros (CCS). CCS is a public 
business entity with assets separate from those of the State. It 
has provided insurance for a comprehensive set of catastrophic 
risks, including earthquake, flooding and terrorism, to both 
private citizens and businesses for several decades. CCS 
insurance is provided automatically on the back of regular 
insurance policies, and financed with a geographically-flat 
“surcharge” calculated on the basis of the capital insured 
and type of policy (residential homes, offices, shops, etc.). 
The premium is collected via the insurance companies that 
provide the policy. While it is not compulsory to have these 
“extraordinary” risks covered with CCS, the surcharge is still 
due once a regular insurance policy is set up. This system 
has enabled Spain to reach a high level of penetration of 
catastrophe insurance.24 Apart from the fact that all policies 
are sold by private insurance companies, collaboration with 
primary industry players is ensured, as CCS’ 12-member 
Board includes six high-level executives of private insurance 
companies. This board structure aims to ensure that CCS only 
takes up the risks that the market is not willing to cover, and 
indeed there appears to be little interest in expanding into 
catastrophic risk in the Spanish insurance market. 
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BEST FOR strategic positions in the value chain
Insurer PGE
Best for ensuring cover to citizens in a region or country 
heavily exposed to a peril. It can effectively use risk 
redistribution as a strategic response especially where cover 
is mandatory, or insurance penetration is high. 
Reinsurer PGE
Best for responding to fluctuations in (re)insurance capital 
supply for a peril. It can effectively move between risk 
removal and risk redistribution or combine both responses. 
Market Capture PGE
Best for a country that aims to provide comprehensive 
insurance cover for its citizens at a controlled price. Suitable 
for contexts with a nationalised approach to public goods 
and facilities. 
3.3 SUMMARY
In section 3.1, we have shown the strategic responses of risk 
removal and risk redistribution through which PGEs use market 
mechanisms of risk transfer to address the socio-political 
objectives for which they have been established. At the same 
time, as we show in Section 3.2, such market-based solutions 
intervene in the natural functioning of a market in ways that 
may have unintended consequences for the market. Hence, 
there will often be tensions between market and socio-political 
interests, particularly as PGEs endeavour to evolve alongside 
the evolving protection gap. 
If the co-opting of robust and healthy (re)insurance markets 
is seen as critical to the ability to solve the protection gap, in 
collaboration with government initiatives, it is important that 
these markets are maintained. At the same time, as we suggest 
in our examples of risk redistribution, the intervention of PGEs 
can have unintended social consequences that might even 
exacerbate inequality. Hence, none of the strategic responses 
we discuss, or the positions in the value chain are necessarily 
right or best for PGEs. Rather, each response and each 
archetype represent specific ways of managing a localised 
protection gap that is itself evolving. Critically, therefore, 
ongoing dialogue and cooperation between state and market 
parties will be important to allow social and market interests to 
evolve in tandem.
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SECTION 4. Protection for sovereigns: 
Insurance as a disaster  
liquidity product 
One of the objectives that PGEs are set up to address is the 
desire to protect sovereign states with fragile economies that 
are highly exposed to natural catastrophe, where there is little 
insurance penetration (see Objective 3 in Section 2). Such 
PGEs address a different protection gap from those found in 
mature insurance markets. Specifically, they are not attempting 
to fund reconstruction for private citizens and businesses after 
damage and loss. Here, the gap lies between a need for a rapid 
humanitarian response after a disaster and the capability of a 
sovereign to meet those costs. The sovereign is the ‘insured’, 
taking responsibility for the nation’s risk, and the level of its 
cover through the PGE. 
The resulting insurance products are not designed, at least 
initially, to supply the funds necessary for governments to fully 
rebuild critical infrastructure such as roads, water and sewage 
systems, hospitals, and schools. Instead, payouts from these 
products enable governments to keep running in the aftermath 
of a disaster and provide key disaster relief functions,15,16,17 
particularly in the critical period between disaster striking and 
international aid arriving. Because of this, they are sometimes 
referred to as disaster liquidity products, which term we use in 
this report. 
These PGEs are organizational vehicles aiming to: 
a) quantify (through catastrophe modelling17 and strategic 
planning) the level of disaster relief funding which might 
be needed after future catastrophes;
b) transfer some risk for such outlay from the government 
budget to a capital market.
In this way, they provide sovereigns with autonomy over at 
least some of their own disaster response, so reducing their 
reliance on aid. “What we’ve had in the past in terms of a natural disasters, was a heavy reliance on development 
partners coming in with aid to assist us in recovery and 
to help us work through rebuilding. We looked at this and 
decided that we need to do something ourselves in terms of 
preparedness.” (Government stakeholder)
Both the PGEs formed, and the relation they address between 
risk and payout, differ from those in mature insurance markets, 
as we now discuss. 
4.1 CALCULATING INSURANCE AS DISASTER LIQUIDITY
Historically, the idea of fulfilling a need for disaster liquidity via 
insurance was new, and needed an innovative solution. That 
solution was found by adapting the financial instrument known 
as a Catastrophe (CAT) bond, which was already well-known 
to insurance markets. The key point of this type of product 
for the purposes of this report, is the parametric basis for 
modelling risk and triggering payment. Products that work on 
a parametric basis disburse payment not on the basis of actual 
losses, but when a particular parameter (for instance, wind 
speed in certain locations, or total rainfall, or modelled losses) 
or index of parameters reaches a determined threshold  
(see Glossary). 
This structure allows insurance products to overcome the 
limited data available on exposure, vulnerability, and historic 
losses in countries which require disaster liquidity.25 These 
disadvantages make it very difficult to estimate risk and create 
insurance products for reconstruction of individual buildings 
or facilities. Indeed, traditional insurance penetration in such 
countries is low. 
However, disaster liquidity does not need models which can 
estimate detailed damage and loss to property. Instead, it 
needs to relate the probability and the severity of a particular 
disaster occurring in a specific region (such as a hurricane at 
Category 5 passing through the island of Barbados), with the 
overall potential damage to, and human consequences for that 
region, and the operations needed to restore civil society. In 
such models, the parameters would be the hurricane Category 
(5), and the direct ‘hit’ on a particular area in Barbados. On the 
basis of the models, estimates can be made for the funding 
needed by the sovereign government to take effective action. 
Triggers can then be established that enable a payout of a 
particular size if a hurricane does occur at that wind speed 
in a set of agreed geographical locations, as declared by an 
independent third party.
A key function of disaster-liquidity PGEs is therefore to develop 
the necessary modelling capability to relate the risk of different 
levels of disaster to the level of funding which might be 
necessary to keep Government and society functioning. 
All parametric products entail the risk of the parameters or 
modelled losses not providing an accurate reflection of the 
gravity of the disaster (so called ‘basis risk’). Hence these 
products have often evolved from an initial binary trigger – in 
which a single specified level of severity must be reached 
to release the entire amount of capital. With such a binary 
trigger, if a disaster comes in at just under the severity of the 
parameters, there would be no payout despite significant need 
for emergency government expenditure. This situation can 
undermine a sovereign’s confidence in a product. Increasingly, 
therefore, there are staggered threshold triggers that enable 
partial payments at different levels of agreed severity.
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4.2  PGES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL AND MARKET 
STAKEHOLDERS
Disaster-liquidity PGEs are typically an outcome of the 
collaboration and technical support between: 
• one or more sovereign states; 
• one or more development organizations, such as the  
World Bank;
• donor organizations, such as DFID in the UK;
• scientific and modelling organizations. 
The resultant PGE may be the initiative of a single sovereign, 
such as FONDEN in Mexico,26 or, increasingly, multi-sovereign 
risk pools, such as CCRIF (see case study), ARC (with a 
potential membership of all African nations), or PCRAFI 
(providing disaster risk modelling and transfer to Pacific Island 
countries). When multiple sovereigns develop a risk pool,14 
they benefit from greater risk diversification and also enhance 
their purchasing power in global markets. As indicated in the 
case study of the CCRIF, it is critical that sufficient sovereigns 
remain members of the pool, to ensure this diversification 
and critical mass. Negotiating their ongoing purchase of cover 
can thus be a source of tension during the annual renewals 
between PGEs and their members. 
The history of CCRIF: The Caribbean multi-sovereign  
risk pool 
In 2004 Hurricane Ivan devastated Grenada and caused 
heavy damage in other areas such as Jamaica and the 
Cayman Islands. Recognising that they were all highly 
exposed to similar hazards such as tropical cyclones 
and earthquakes, the twenty countries of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) decided to approach the World Bank 
for help to manage their disaster risk. Under the technical 
leadership of the World Bank, a multi-sovereign risk pool, the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), was 
proposed to transfer some of the risk of disaster into global 
reinsurance markets. Collectively, each of these relatively 
small countries would benefit from shared technical 
expertise, diversification across their member states, and 
increased reinsurance purchasing power. 
Proprietary insurance models for the region were sparse, 
so the pool first needed to develop data and modelling 
capabilities to help members quantify their risk. A Japanese 
Government grant helped provide scientific expertise which 
came up with a novel proposal: to provide disaster liquidity 
insurance products based on parametric triggers, through 
which member countries could gain an injection of capital  
to manage their cash flow in the immediate aftermath  
of disaster. 
With such a novel solution the process of establishing a 
coalition of member countries and donors involved intense 
outreach, communication and preparation, including two 
international conferences. As a result, operating capital was 
provided by contributions to a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) 
from the Governments of Canada, the UK, France, Ireland and 
Bermuda; from the European Union, the World Bank, and 
the Caribbean Development Bank, and through membership 
fees paid by participating governments.
CCRIF thus formed in 2007 as the world’s first multi-
sovereign risk pool providing parametric insurance. In fact, in 
its first year, the new products demonstrated their value with 
Saint Lucia and Dominica receiving payouts totalling almost 
US$1 million after an earthquake in November. The next year 
Turks and Caicos Islands received a US$6.3 million payment 
after the impacts of Hurricane Ike. 
Since then CCRIF has not been static. There have been active 
efforts to retain and gain members, in part by developing an 
increased range of products, such as excess rainfall, all of 
which required additional data and modelling. In 2014 CCRIF 
was restructured into a segregated portfolio company (SPC) 
to facilitate an expansion of the CCRIF membership base 
the next year. Through partnership, CCRIF started offering 
earthquake, tropical cyclone and excess rainfall policies to 
Central American governments. 
The expansion required additional funding. In 2014, another 
MDTF was established by the World Bank to support the 
development of CCRIF SPC’s new products for current and 
potential members, and facilitate the entry for Central 
American countries and additional Caribbean countries. 
The MDTF currently channels funds from various donors, 
including: the governments of Canada, the United States, 
Germany, and the European Union. In 2017, the Caribbean 
Development Bank, with resources provided by Mexico, 
provided funding for enhanced insurance coverage to the 
Bank’s Borrowing Member Countries.
Today CCRIF has 16 member countries from the Caribbean 
and 1 from Central America. As of May 2018, CCRIF has 
issued total payouts of US$130 million to 13 member 
countries, all within 14 days of disaster. During the annual 
policy renewal negotiations with member governments, 
CCRIF works actively to help members understand their 
risk, provide a business case to support them in finding the 
necessary financial allocation in their budgets to continue 
buying risk transfer products, and reassure them that CCRIF 
continues to remain relevant to members’ needs through 
continuous evolution. 
CCRIF soon will be introducing three new products; for 
drought, agriculture and fisheries. It is also discussing the 
feasibility of introducing parametric insurance in other 
sectors that are adversely impacted by disasters and where 
insurance is not always easily accessible on a timely basis. 
Product ideas discussed cover other industries, such as 
tourism, and public utilities such as power and telecoms. 
Through such efforts CCRIF can both broaden the risk pool 
and increase its diversity, and, more importantly, evolve to 
meet the needs of a wider range of insureds.
The market players to whom the risk is transferred are typically 
global reinsurers, not aid or non-profit organizations. They 
price and trade risk for profit and issue payouts on the basis 
of commercially agreed market triggers. However, during the 
establishment of the PGE, other parties such as development 
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and donor organizations may operate on a different basis that 
is not strictly commercial. 
1. Most technical modelling of financial products is done 
on a proprietary or market basis, with the expectation to 
recoup the costs of developing the models from either 
trading products or licensing those models to others 
to trade products. However, in the case of developing 
economies, the rate of insurance penetration is too low to 
justify development of risk models on a strictly commercial 
basis. Rather, donors or development organizations may 
pay for the development of the technical infrastructure that 
the PGE then draws upon to generate products. 
2. The ultimate intention is for sovereigns to pay their own 
premiums, as part of taking responsibility for their own 
disaster response. However, in exceptional cases, such as 
the Caribbean Development Bank’s payments of Haiti’s 
premiums for membership of the CCRIF, donors may pay 
the premiums for some sovereigns, enabling them to 
participate in the risk-transfer product. Sometimes these 
payments are on a sliding scale, decreasing each year as 
the sovereign assumes greater understanding of both the 
product, and command of their resources to pay their  
own premiums. 
As these points suggest, such PGEs bring together an 
especially complex set of parties with both market and 
social objectives. In particular, donors and development 
organizations, with their social mission, play a key role 
in establishing these PGEs and enabling the transfer of 
sovereign risk to financial markets. However, an important 
feature of these schemes is that they enable a path through 
which countries become increasingly able to access financial 
markets, self-fund, and expand their insurance cover. 
4.3 BENEFITS OF DISASTER LIQUIDITY PRODUCTS 
While these disaster liquidity products are different in aim 
and scope from traditional catastrophe insurance products, 
they have certain advantages for countries with emerging 
insurance markets, which allow them to play an important role 
in recovery from catastrophe. The main advantages include: 
1. Financial protection. These products, with their limited 
scope, have smaller premiums (and payouts) than 
traditional insurance products, and are therefore  
more affordable. 
2. Rapid payout. Payouts from these products generally fall 
far below the cost of the devastation actually experienced 
by a country. However, their effect is considered amplified 
because of the rapidity of payment. Cash flow in the 
immediate aftermath of disaster can provide services 
that prevent the humanitarian crisis from escalating.27 For 
example, in a drought, the provision of food to people 
within their communities can prevent migration and the 
development of a refugee crisis. Similarly, the provision of 
clean water and shelter after a hurricane can prevent the 
development of illness that escalates the crisis. Hence, it 
is not simply the size of the payment, but its timing in the 
disaster response that is critical. “I remember when we saw the payment from CCRIF after the earthquake, it was 
very quick… The President declared a state of emergency 
and so we put the money in an emergency budget. Then 
the Government could use this money to respond.” (Government stakeholder)
3. The introduction of these products generates new 
knowledge and expertise. Data access and collection 
improves, resulting in stronger modelling capability. This 
can have positive effects in two ways:
a. Growth of insurance. Governments and other 
public organizations gradually develop a deeper 
understanding of how these products work and 
are educated on the benefits of insurance-based 
risk transfer mechanisms. The inflow of data and 
modelling capability can work for the mutual benefit 
of stakeholders’ social and market objectives. It can 
expand the appetite of governments to increase their 
risk cover and of market players to provide capital for 
such cover in these regions. For instance, CCRIF, after 10 
years in operation, it is introducing additional disaster 
products such as for excess rainfall, and additional 
insurance products such as for fisheries,28 in response 
to the needs of its member countries. “Here people were not very financially literate about it … but I think 
the work we are doing is very important for all the other 
stakeholders that are now interested in this specific 
market because we kind of opened the door to it.” (PGE stakeholder). The establishment of insurance 
products for disaster liquidity may also stimulate the 
progressive development of insurance products for 
reconstruction of national infrastructure, as and when 
countries can afford to purchase such cover.
b. Empowerment over disaster response. As data and 
modelling expertise improve, governments can better 
understand their vulnerability from potential disasters 
and so improve disaster mitigation and resilience. For 
example, they can gain a better understanding of the 
risk they are carrying and its impact on their budgets, 
enabling better financial planning for catastrophic risk. 
“Thanks to [the PGE] we now have exact figures. Knowing that three years ago there was [a disaster] and 
it cost you this, but if you had insurance it would have 
cost you this … When you have those figures, it is really 
clear to explain to a Minister that you can better plan for 
your finances … then you realize that OK, yes, maybe we 
should consider [insurance] going forward.”  (PGE stakeholder) 
These products can also enable governments to take 
more responsibility for and have more control over their 
response to disasters – for instance, by formulating 
costed contingency plans – and reduce their reliance 
on international aid organizations. “The fact that it is the [sovereigns] that initiated the creation of [this PGE] 
is also a big signal that [this region of the world] now 
wants to take that issue into their own hands and not 
just wait for the solution to come from outside.”  (PGE stakeholder)
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In general, PGEs aimed at disaster liquidity have proved 
a successful marriage of social and market objectives. 
Participants from the insurance markets benefit because a new 
market is made accessible, and because modelling techniques 
are expanded; governments and other social agents learn to 
achieve social objectives via market mechanisms, which can 
leverage their resources.
4.4 ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
The disaster liquidity products being developed by PGEs must 
also overcome some challenges to realize their many positive 
effects. Key enabling conditions include:
1. Their aim should be clearly communicated, so that they 
do not engender misplaced expectations about the 
nature and extent of the cover provided. This is critical 
as misunderstanding about what these products can do 
(finance disaster response with a specified amount in a 
specified time period) and cannot do (finance property 
reconstruction) can lead to backlashes that might reduce 
trust in the product and reduce future levels of insurance 
protection.
“So at first I was not a fan. But then I spent time getting more acquainted with the product, how it works, the trigger, 
understanding the trigger. And at that point I recognised 
that like any other business, they are selling a product, and 
really and truly the failure was at the level of governments 
not spending enough time to appreciate the product and 
what it can or cannot do for them.”  (Government stakeholder)
2. Improving the metrics for modelled losses, pricing and 
triggers for payments is also vital to increase sovereigns’ 
confidence in their ability to use these products as part 
of the ex-ante preparation for disaster. Better modelling 
also helps in attracting market players to invest in creating 
their own products to transfer these types of risks into the 
capital market. 
3. Adherence to market signals is a vital principle in 
promoting market confidence. In the long term it will 
enable the market to make the fullest contribution to the 
social development objective – that of giving sovereigns 
autonomy over their own affairs. 
 In the shorter term, and more particularly in the early 
stages of model and product development, market 
interests to stick to the modelled triggers may conflict 
with the social development interests to provide relief. 
For example, in the case of Malawi, triggers were not met 
per the contract agreement placed by the government 
but conditions on the ground demonstrated a clear case 
of a drought event (with this discrepancy driven largely 
by some of the modelling customisation assumptions).29 
Being proactive about investigating such situations and 
finding technical solutions grounded in the models and 
methodological triggering approach are critical, as well  
as the flexibility to accompany such learning process in 
these countries.
 For developing countries, where insurance is seen as a 
luxury in extremely fiscally constrained circumstances, 
simply sticking to contracts that may be incompatible with 
the development mandate of PGEs could prove counter 
productive. Indeed, embedding market principles and 
developing financial capabilities, gives confidence to 
market-players and empowers sovereign states to manage 
their own risk. Likewise, the flexibility to accommodate 
the required learning process among multiple parties with 
different interests is an ongoing challenge for these PGEs, 
necessitating multi-party dialogue and flexibility.
4. The success of disaster liquidity products as tools to 
address the protection gap depends on the governments’ 
ability to spend the money rapidly and effectively. 
Effectiveness of these products is likely to be enhanced 
where governments are accountable for the use of payouts 
to their citizens and sponsors. 
“One of the biggest problems is the lack of accountability at national level in terms of how these payouts are used. 
Visibly you are unable to link payouts in to the recovery 
and early reconstruction phases or in serving as any sort of 
mechanism for reducing risk, going back to this argument 
about how insurance can drive risk reduction. Because 
there’s no accountability around how it does that.” (Government stakeholder)
 Efforts to promote accountability involve developing and 
reporting on contingency plans for the use of resources, 
as a condition of payment (e.g. ARC), or may involve 
more voluntary forms of reporting (e.g. CCRIF, PCRAFI). 
For example, ARC members are first required to provide 
contingency plans showing how beneficiaries will be 
targeted before they can access insurance and second are 
subject to process and financial audits when they receive 
a payout in order to ensure efficient and targeted spent of 
the money. This ex ante approach is innovative in linking 
accountability for the use of public funding for insurance 
with the targeted delivery of relief to the most vulnerable.
5. Most multi-sovereign PGEs act as a risk-pooling 
mechanism. To be effective as a source of capital 
protection, they need to have a large enough member 
base, and these members need to be retained over a 
number of years. This ensures diversification across 
geographic regions and perils, improving the pools’ own 
capital optimization and ability to pay for member losses, 
and also their purchasing power. Hence, as indicated in 
the CCRIF case, efforts need to focus on building members’ 
common purposes for remaining with the PGE. 
A PGE which attends to the conditions outlined above, in its 
remit or its evolution, should enjoy the confidence of sovereign 
states, their citizens and wider stakeholders that government 
money is well placed in purchasing risk transfer products, and 
that the PGE itself meets the various market, humanitarian, and 
political objectives of the different parties.
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Road map to success for PGEs’ disaster liquidity products 
• Effective communication about the product as immediate 
relief post-disaster, rather than as more large-scale 
reconstruction
• Continuous improvement of the modelling for product 
development and metrics that trigger payment
• Supporting effective and accountable use of funds to 
alleviate hardship post disaster
• Ensuring effective pooling through diversification and 
retention of members
4.5 SUMMARY
Overall, the establishment of PGEs and disaster liquidity 
products in the context of low-income countries or those 
with low insurance penetration redefines the protection 
gap. Such schemes redefine who or what may be insured, 
extending the ability of insurance to protect against disaster to 
sovereigns for the purposes of providing cash flow to manage 
disaster response. Disaster liquidity products were therefore 
a significant innovation in the treatment of under-insurance: 
disaster relief and humanitarian crisis had not previously 
been considered areas in which ex-ante market mechanisms 
might be deployed. But their creation has prompted new ways 
of looking at the protection gap debate. For instance, some 
donations to poor countries which might previously have gone 
directly into government expenditure are now used to buy 
disaster liquidity cover, or to provide operating capital for PGEs 
to support countries to buy their own disaster liquidity cover, 
so leveraging the donation. 
Certainly, PGEs of this sort are growing both in their regional 
spread with new multi-sovereign PGEs being considered 
and existing PGEs growing their membership, and in terms 
of the range of cover offered. At the same time, these types 
of products are being applied to a wider range of gaps, as 
evidenced by the recent development of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) catastrophe bond for pandemics. 
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SECTION 5. Bridging and reducing the 
protection gap: PGEs’ role 
in resilience 
Disaster resilience is the ability of individuals, communities, 
organizations and states to survive, adapt to, and recover 
from catastrophic events; and to adapt their structures and 
behaviours to reduce the potential damage from future 
perils.30,31 There is an important relationship between PGEs 
as providers of insurance to those who might otherwise be 
un-insured, and the disaster resilience of a society. One aspect 
of this relationship can be improved financial resilience, 
where insurance provides the capital to support recovery. 
Such initiatives help bridge the protection gap by providing 
financial solutions. However, if financial solutions lead purely 
to reconstruction of what was destroyed, they leave the 
underlying vulnerability unchanged. Given the importance 
of social as well as market objectives, reducing the gap by 
reducing vulnerability through more resilient forms of building 
can also help to fulfil the social objectives of PGEs. One way 
that PGEs can support both bridging and reducing the gap is 
through their effects in generating technical knowledge for 
identifying, measuring and better preparing for risk. 
Paradoxically, PGEs, with some exceptions, are not in a 
position to influence resilience measures directly. Rather, 
governments are generally the central agents in improving 
resilience. Through their many sub-entities at both national 
and local levels, they have the legislative power to drive 
resilience through tools such as environmental policies, 
land-use planning, building codes and standards, defensive 
infrastructure, and disaster relief. Hence, PGEs must work with 
and through their interdependent stakeholders, particularly 
government, in supporting the relationship between insurance 
and resilience. 
We present a Protection Gap Entities (PGEs) Resilience 
Framework, adapted from the World Bank 5 pillars 
framework,32 to show how PGEs, through their effects in 
increasing insurance cover, can also support key aspects  
of resilience. 
PGEs are put in place specifically to increase the financial 
resilience of both insurance markets to shock (Objective 1 
in Section 2) and policyholders and governments to large 
and/or frequent disasters (Objectives 2&3 in Section 2). 
This function is indicated in Figure 5.1 by the thick arrow to 
financial protection. However, risk identification is central 
to managing the various elements of disaster resilience, 
since society cannot prepare for, mitigate against, or arrange 
financial protection from risks that are not identified. We 
position PGEs, via their role in supporting the insurance-
based financing of disaster, as one critical mechanism for 
enhancing risk identification. Of course, there are other ways to 
promote risk identification. For instance, public organizations 
and technologists may use open data and open software 
tools to identify the risks posed by natural disasters33 and 
humanitarian organizations may work with local communities 
to map vulnerable areas34. However, because of their role in 
supporting insurance against disaster, PGEs are especially 
well-positioned to enhance risk identification; and thereafter, 
PGEs have some unique characteristics that enable them to 
play a potentially pivotal role. 
Figure 5.1. PGE Resilience Framework32
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5.1 PGES’ ROLE IN RISK IDENTIFICATION 
Risk identification refers to building the capacity to identify, 
assess and analyse risk, typically as a technical capability 
supporting the quantification of risk.35 The insurance industry, 
in collaboration with natural and environmental scientists, 
follows a specified risk-identification process to enable the 
transfer of risk within the value chain: from modelling the 
hazard; assessing the vulnerability of a particular region to that 
hazard; then calculating the exposure of property and citizens 
to that hazard, and the potential loss arising from a severe 
occurrence of the hazard. As a result, it can price cover based 
on the probability and severity of a loss. 
Data and model generation. Since the early 1990s, there 
have been significant developments in catastrophe modelling, 
largely driven by advances in the availability of computing 
power and data, and by the commercial needs of the (re)
insurance industry to price and trade in risk. 
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Where such data and modelling capabilities are lacking, as 
in emerging markets (see Section 4), or in relation to new 
forms of risk such as terrorism, PGEs are critical catalysts 
in establishing data for risk identification. PGEs can be 
particularly effective in promoting risk identification and 
making it relevant to government policy, because they 
construct a direct link between risk identification and financial 
solutions that may act as complementary or substitutive forms 
of funding for governments. The search for a financial solution 
drives the coordination of existing data and models and the 
development of new ones. 
Even in mature insurance markets where data exists, PGEs 
often have a key role in identifying the most exposed areas of 
risk, because they can collect, refine and recombine existing 
modelling and data analytics that were generated for purposes 
outside the insurance industry, such as environmental projects. 
For example, Flood Re, at its inception drew upon a wide 
range of data from the insurance industry but also the UK 
Environment Agency to identify those properties most likely 
to be at risk. Hence, PGEs promote the collection of data and 
identification of what may otherwise have been over-looked or 
unmodeled risk.
Information transfer for social and market objectives. 
While pricing risk may be specific to its transfer, other 
aspects of insurance industry risk identification can have 
wide application. In particular they support the estimation 
of aggregate losses in particular regions, as a basis for 
various government initiatives. As they are not-for-profit 
organizations, PGEs do not need to make such modelled 
information proprietary but can provide it as a ‘public good’ to 
other parties. “It would be a shame to just collect this data for insurance and not make it accessible for other uses. So it 
was good to identify other data formats that [the modelling 
company] was willing to share that wouldn’t actually jeopardise 
any proprietary uses.” (PGE stakeholder) 
PGEs can therefore be a valuable two-way conduit for 
information between the insurance market and society. 
Disparate data gathered in social, environmental or 
population-based projects can be used to improve insurance 
modelling. Once available, insurance modelling increases the 
ability to identify and understand risk, both in general terms 
and in terms of economic consequences. Identifying risk can 
provide the motivation and information necessary to increase 
risk mitigation and disaster resilience. Indeed, the insurance 
industry is involved with efforts to improve and share ‘pre-
competitive’ risk-modelling data in several countries.36 
Creating an ecosystem. In promoting risk identification, 
PGEs stimulate the development of an ecosystem, comprising 
professionals from aid, science, development, policy, 
commercial (re)insurance, and government ministries, for 
producing information that underpins all forms of disaster 
resilience. Interaction across this ecosystem creates at least 
two major spill-over effects:
1. Better understanding of the hazard and the associated 
vulnerability allows governments to better assess the 
economic costs of disasters and how they impact the 
budget of different ministries, as this quote on the role of 
terrorism PGEs indicates: 
 “There is nowhere in government where they are looking at these terrorist events in terms of economic loss. They 
will look at those terrorist events as terrorist acts, they will 
be looking at them from an operational and a political 
perspective … but they won’t be looking at those events as 
something that will cost them a lot of money. And there’s 
a role for [PGE] I think to conduct that kind of research 
on government’s behalf… it would then be able to inform 
government; ‘Look, if we’d had a similar attack in [our 
country], the consequential loss [from loss of tourism, 
disruption to transport etc] would have been X billion and 
[PGE] doesn’t cover that’.” (Government stakeholder)
2. Improved risk identification also supports the design 
of new financial products (whether provided by PGEs 
themselves or not) that may complement and extend the 
relief provided by insurance-based products. An example 
is forecast-based financing (FbF) as a technique to fill gaps 
in humanitarian aid. It uses the science of weather and 
climate to anticipate possible impacts in risk-prone areas 
and to mobilize resources automatically before an event.37 
Such forecasting can also support insurance triggers. 
For example, satellite data can now be used to forecast 
drought based on levels of green-ness, and so to put in 
place humanitarian strategies before catastrophe occurs.38 
In these ways, PGEs can have a direct effect on the relationship 
between risk identification and financial resilience in the face 
of potential disaster. 
5.2  PGES ROLE IN RISK REDUCTION AND RESILIENT 
RECONSTRUCTION 
Insurance can enhance resilience by providing incentives 
for behaviours that either reduce risk or improve resilient 
reconstruction. Examples might be the implementation of 
risk reduction measures such as levee banks and drainage 
systems that change the built environment, or improved 
building codes for reconstruction after disasters.39 In improving 
risk identification, PGEs can also indirectly influence these 
areas even so that they rarely have direct responsibility for 
implementing physical and behavioural resilience measures. 
Under pure market conditions, a property highly exposed to 
risk would find it difficult to get affordable cover; this would 
dampen the market for high-risk property (since mortgage 
conditions typically require insurance cover), and thereby 
discourage building in high-risk areas or with insufficient 
risk mitigation features. Such a situation could motivate risk 
reduction behaviours both in policyholders, who may build to 
different structural codes in order to improve the insurability of 
their properties, and in planning authorities, in terms of where 
to build and what mitigation features to include. However, as 
developed economies already have significant property that 
has been built to varying structural codes in highly-exposed 
areas, such pure market conditions do not exist. 
Incentivizing risk reduction. PGEs ameliorate some of these 
legacy effects by providing financial support to properties and 
regions that do not have inbuilt risk reduction features. PGEs 
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can still incentivize better risk reduction behaviours going 
forward. For instance, in the UK, properties eligible for the 
Flood Re scheme had to be built prior to January 2009. This 
was to ensure that the PGE was not incentivizing development 
of new buildings in flood prone areas. Flood Re’s mandate 
also includes promoting flood management action through 
the use of data to support decision-making by Government, 
the Devolved Administrations, Local Authorities and others, 
including the Environment Agency and the Committee on 
Climate Change.40 
Placed between governments and markets, PGEs are well-
equipped to coordinate resilience action on both fronts. 
The insurance industry might have loss data and/or the 
technical expertise to identify and calculate high risk areas 
and consult on efficient ways of resilient rebuilding; but only 
governments can introduce and enforce policy-making such 
as land-use planning and building codes. However, our results 
show that while PGEs sit at the nexus of various stakeholders 
within governments and markets, they typically lack the 
formal power to introduce and impose the uptake of risk-
reduction measures. Usually their remit is limited to providing 
consultation on resilience and attempting to influence the 
various stakeholders based on their position in the risk  
transfer value chain. In Figure 5.1 therefore, we depict the link 
from the PGE’s role in risk identification to risk reduction as 
relatively weak. 
Nonetheless, PGEs coordinate multiple sectors (e.g. insurance, 
resilience, governments) and disciplines (natural, financial, 
social science), enabling knowledge-sharing and capacity-
building. They are increasingly eager to provide information 
on risk mitigation to improve risk reduction behaviours. For 
example, the ARPC terrorism pool in Australia has identified 
some key structural features, such as bollards that limit the 
positioning of explosives near key points in buildings. As such 
features will reduce the risk of certain terrorism activities, the 
PGE is offering premium discounts for companies that install 
such measures. Price is thus used as a means to incentivize 
behavioural change. 
Other PGEs, notably the CEA, have invested heavily in 
understanding how reconstruction of legacy properties can be 
linked to mitigation of loss from earthquake damage. Their risk 
identification activities have enabled them to understand how 
to retrofit structural adaptations to existing at-risk properties, 
prior to an event, so as to limit the damage caused by 
earthquake. As part of their statutory requirements, they use 
this information to actively support risk reduction by offering 
retrofit packages that take advantage of tax discounts and that 
can even be cost neutral for the homeowner. 
Constraints around PGE influence over risk reduction. 
Despite this, evidence from post-flood reconstruction grants 
in the UK41 and retrofit packages in California42, shows 
that uptake appears to be low. The reasons are various, 
ranging from difficulties in communicating and distributing 
reconstruction grants, to poor understanding by policyholders 
of the potential risks of damage, to concerns over the cost, 
timing and inconvenience of reconstruction. 
Such findings indicate the difficulty for PGEs in implementing 
risk reduction measures, and ex ante retrofitting in particular, 
without legislative support. However, these same measures 
can be used in resilient reconstruction, where the PGE pays 
the claim on the proviso that rebuilding follows specific 
reconstruction codes. PGEs that provide insurance cover to 
highly-exposed properties may have a more direct influence 
over resilient reconstruction, particularly where the payment 
of claims may be linked to enforceable structural codes for 
rebuilding. In Figure 5.1 we therefore indicate this influence on 
resilient reconstruction by a relatively thick arrow. 
5.3 PGES ROLE IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
The link to disaster preparedness is the weakest link shown 
in Figure 5.1. Financial protection, risk reduction and 
resilient reconstruction can all be tied together through risk 
identification in a logical virtuous cycle, in which better-
constructed properties that reduce risk are more affordable 
to protect financially, whilst financial protection enables 
more resilient reconstruction post-disaster that subsequently 
reduces risk. Nonetheless, as explained in section 5.3, this is 
not easy for a PGE to influence directly. Disaster preparedness, 
involving early warning systems and contingency planning,35 
is even more remote from PGE influence. A PGE may have 
the data to indicate the likelihood of loss, and so to support 
understanding of how to prepare for it, but may not have the 
remit to encourage such preparedness. 
Some PGEs, however, are set up with a remit to build links from 
risk identification to disaster preparedness. ARC is a case in 
point. A key feature of the way ARC inducts its member states 
is to take them through a process of risk modelling, which is 
used to develop early warning systems of impending disaster, 
and to undertake contingency planning for how specifically, 
they will use any payouts to address the disaster, prior to 
taking out the risk financing component of membership.43 
The establishment of such risk preparedness procedures in 
ARC is helped by the fact that most of the scheme deals with 
drought, a slow-onset disaster in which the impact can be 
observed, and systems put in place as the disaster worsens. 
In addition, the payments are intended to support food 
security, for which, again, there can be contingency planning in 
advance. Preparedness for other types of peril, where onset is 
more rapid, may be different. Nonetheless, some early warning 
systems to support, at the least, evacuation in the path of 
a hurricane, and other similar measures, may be spillover 
benefits from the risk modelling and identification promoted 
by PGEs.
5.4 SUMMARY
The primary purpose of a PGE is financial protection of those 
who are potentially under-insured. We might describe this 
extension of the reach of insurance as bridging the protection 
gap, and the role of the PGE as increasing financial resilience 
However, for a society to solve the protection gap, increasing 
financial resilience is not generally enough. In high-risk 
areas particularly, it is essential to reduce risk, and thereby 
reduce the protection gap, which means that other aspects 
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of resilience – resilient reconstruction, risk reduction and 
preparedness – are essential (see Figure 5.1). 
We have shown that PGEs have a key role in risk identification, 
and thus they can influence or enable these other aspects 
of resilience. Increasing the uptake of resilience measures 
has an impact on the social goal of reducing the protection 
gap. In addition, it can reduce the frequency and severity of 
loss, which means that PGEs will have to pay lower claims, 
decreasing the financial impact on their balance sheet. 
To enhance PGEs’ role in resilience, we suggest:
• Build formal power in resilience: Being identified as 
independent, and being a centre of risk expertise, places 
PGEs in a unique position regarding resilience. However, 
they usually lack the formal power to enable the uptake 
of resilience measures and are restricted to, at best, an 
advisory role. For instance, Flood Re is doing research to 
understand how to incentivize the uptake of resilience 
measures, but without formal powers, it can only cooperate 
with the insurance industry and the government to promote 
its position in risk reduction.44 Potential ways to increase 
formal power could be to give PGEs a mandate to enforce 
resilient reconstruction after a disaster or to financially 
incentivize citizens to take risk reduction measures. CCS 
for instance can request resilience measures to be taken in 
order to continue to provide cover. 
• Enhance useful links with(in) government: PGEs can be 
public or private organizations or public-private partnership 
organizations. They are either part of the government or at 
least collaborate directly with governmental departments. 
Even the PGEs that are private organizations have a strong 
public purpose. PGEs hold information and develop technical 
expertise that is critical for central and local governments 
in supporting resilience initiatives. For instance, in both 
FONDEN and CCR, the data used for risk modelling to 
develop (re)insurance products is integrated with the data 
used for disaster management. By linking government 
departments involved with planning for disaster, planning 
for infrastructure and financial planning, PGEs can help 
build a more comprehensive approach to resilience. Formal 
channels of communication and collaboration between PGEs 
and parts of the government that have powers over these 
different aspects of resilience should be strengthened. 
• Evolve remit but avoid mission creep: A PGEs is developed 
to address a specified protection gap by invoking a market 
mechanism. PGEs may be a means of coordinating the 
different interdependencies involved in resilience, but their 
specific expertise is in providing insurance-based measures, 
rather than initiating resilience measures. Expanding PGE’s 
remit in resilience should avoid mission creep, losing focus 
and bloating their role. We suggested that PGEs need to 
evolve over time alongside their stakeholders and their 
local protection gap. However, PGEs should be alert not 
to change their mission unintentionally in ways that may 
neglect a continuing necessity to provide affordable financial 
protection, when commercial markets cannot supply it. 
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SECTION 6. Protection Gap Entities or 
Stopgap Entities?
The previous sections have shown that PGEs are usually set up 
with objectives related to a specific and local protection gap. 
These objectives fall into three main categories, (i) addressing 
a sudden disruption in the supply of (re)insurance; (ii) ensuring 
that a portion of the currently insured population that is 
classified as ‘high-risk’ is not priced out of the market; and (iii) 
ensuring the financial viability of governments in the aftermath 
of catastrophic events in countries with low insurance 
penetration (see Section 2). These objectives emerge in the 
aftermath of major catastrophic events that promote political 
engagement and influence opinion in civil society. 
They thus form the basis of a remit around which stakeholders 
with diverse and sometimes conflicting interests can agree 
to join forces in setting up the PGE. Crucially, those interests 
may lean more towards market objectives, or towards social 
objectives; they may prioritise bridging the gap or reducing it; 
and tensions between such interests will need to be managed. 
The need to forge consensus in a short period of time to 
address a crisis means that a PGEs’ remit is often tightly 
constructed around the objective leading to its establishment. 
In such cases, PGEs, as initially set up, can provide only partial 
solutions to the protection gap. 
Paradoxically, while the PGE’s activities may contribute to 
a wider, deeper and more refined understanding of the 
protection gap (see Section 5), their institutional set-up can 
significantly constrain any evolution to address either the 
underlying reasons for the gap or changing circumstances. 
Indeed, stakeholder attention, particularly political attention, 
moves on so that there is typically little will to address change 
until after another disaster exposes a new protection gap. 
In fact, a ‘stopgap’ character is often built into PGEs and their 
remits from the very beginning. Narrow and rigid remits can 
create problematic situations in which stakeholders assume 
the threat of a particular disaster has been covered (because 
the remit has been ‘ticked’), leading to criticisms of the PGE 
when it is unable to respond to losses that were never in its 
scope. However, stakeholders might reasonably expect that 
the PGE is there to address the protection gap, rather than a 
shopping list of objectives related to a narrow part of it. From 
this point of view, PGEs should be able to modify their remit to 
continue to address the gap. 
An opposing point of view holds that complex organizations 
have a well-documented tendency to “mission creep” – 
the expansion of the organization beyond its expertise or 
usefulness. For this reason, many PGEs are explicitly set up 
to be temporary: “We’re a government agency and we’re a temporary organization because we were created as a short-
term stopgap measure for market failure. So we actually have 
a social purpose for existing and we’re not a private sector, for 
profit or private interest organization.” (PGE stakeholder). 
These tensions around flexibility or mission creep, around an 
evolving gap or a fixed purpose, must in fact be constantly 
monitored and managed by all PGEs. The PGE’s remit, the 
stakeholders’ expectations, and the evolving protection 
gap exist in a dynamic balance, as we depict in Figure 6.1. 
Particular problems in managing this balance occur when 
there are mismatched understandings between parties to this 
balancing act, as we now explore.
Figure 6.1. PGE Evolution Framework
Evolving 
Protection gap
Stakeholder’s 
expectations
PGE
PGE's remit
 
6.1 MISMATCH 1: PGE REMIT DOES NOT MATCH 
STAKEHOLDERS’ EXPECTATIONS
Stakeholders may see a PGE as inadequate even when it 
fulfilled its remit. For instance, since its inception in 2007, 
CCRIF has clearly performed extremely well to its remit, making 
payouts totalling US$130 million to 13 member governments; 
all within 14 days of the event.45 Following Hurricane Irma in 
2017, CCRIF issued payouts to 6 member governments within 
14 days of the event. Nonetheless, as one country member 
explained to us, while praising the efficiency with which they 
received their payout: 
“It is a drop in a bucket in terms of the actual loss… The payout for the impact of Hurricane Irma was just over 6 million. 
It helps because Irma was major. We just had a damage and 
loss assessment putting the bill around 338 million, so for 
us that’s just over 100% percent of GDP” (Government stakeholder) 
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Such cases exemplify what we call the Expectations mismatch. 
Disaster-liquidity PGEs (as discussed in Section 4) are not 
intended to address the protection gap for reconstruction in 
such countries – but stakeholders may expect them to do so. 
Disaster-liquidity PGEs generally seem to perform as intended, 
and with good leverage for the premium paid. Yet they can 
have only the most marginal of effects in closing the far larger 
protection gaps for reconstruction which are associated 
with the same disasters. Furthermore, their existence may 
distract from other ways of addressing the immensity of the 
reconstruction protection gap, if stakeholders have unrealistic 
expectations of them.
“They have seen sovereign risk pools in my view as a silver bullet, and so they do not invest in other means of reducing 
risk and exposure and they do not invest in other areas of 
financing that gap that you speak of after an event. … You 
know, when you look at the catastrophic events and you go to 
the donor community to have these donor conferences, when 
you look at the losses versus what is raised even in these 
donor conferences, it’s less than one tenth of the losses. So 
it means there is a significant financing gap for recovery and 
reconstruction.” (Inter-governmental stakeholder)
The problem is that in highly-exposed countries with fragile 
economies, it is difficult to think of any self-funded insurance 
solution that could enable a country’s full reconstruction after 
recurrent disasters that cause losses of the order of magnitude 
of their entire GDP. 
This Expectations mismatch is not only a problem in emerging 
insurance markets, but can also occur in mature markets. For 
example, a terrorist attack, in which a truck drives into crowds 
of people in a tourist area, may cause no property damage. If 
the remit of the PGE is to cover only property damage caused 
by terrorism attack, no payments would be made. But this truck 
attack may cause significant loss of life and will probably have 
a huge economic impact on tourism, due to cancellations and 
last-minute changes by travellers concerned about the threat 
of terrorism. The non-cover of these financial losses does not 
make the PGE unsuccessful, since they were not relevant to 
its remit. Yet, ex-post, some stakeholders, not to mention the 
public, may expect that this ‘should’ have been the remit of 
 the PGE. 
Tackling the mismatch: There are two key ways to deal with 
an Expectations’ mismatch: 
1. Communicating remit and success: It is critical for PGEs 
to communicate their remit clearly to stakeholders. The 
fact that the PGE deals with ‘the protection gap’ can be 
confusing as that term is quite abstract. PGEs are formal 
organizations that have a set of specific goals to achieve 
in relation to a specific protection gap and a specific risk, 
rather than a mission to close the global protection gap. 
Thus, PGEs need to define what constitutes success in 
terms of their remit, so that stakeholders can evaluate 
them based on this predefined set of objectives. 
2. Building other forms of resilience. PGEs, while 
performing many valuable functions, are not a silver 
bullet. Rather, they should be seen as a critical mechanism 
for financial and physical resilience (see Section 5), by 
showing the feasibility and effectiveness of insurance 
products and helping build the expertise around them. 
PGEs support financial resilience (that is, protection from 
financial loss), which in turn can lead to other resilience 
features such as resilient reconstruction, preparedness 
and risk reduction (Figure 5.1). 
6.2  MISMATCH 2: WHEN ADDRESSING ONE PROBLEM 
CREATES ANOTHER 
While PGEs provide an initial solution to an identified 
protection gap, these solutions can have unintended 
consequences. One such consequence is moral hazard. 
This is the situation in which policyholders can engage in 
risky behaviour knowing that other parties (insurers and/or 
government) will incur the cost. Specifically, as explained in 
Section 3.1.2, PGEs, by paying for losses, may unintentionally 
reduce the incentive to engage in risk mitigation, both by 
policyholders and more widely by planning authorities. Indeed, 
after repeated events in flood prone areas, leading to the 
rebuilding of highly exposed properties on more than one 
occasion, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the 
USA has come under attack for precisely this issue, with the 
criticism that “it is subsidized floodplain development”.46 
This problem is exacerbated by a risk redistribution strategy 
(Section 3.1), in which the PGE adopts a pooling mechanism, 
so that low-risk areas cross-subsidize the higher-risk areas. 
When the actual risk of living on a floodplain or an earthquake 
fault-line is not reflected in the premium, then policyholders 
have little incentive to engage in risk mitigation strategies 
that would lower the cost of their premiums, or the cost of 
rebuilding. As time goes on, and flood or earthquake strikes 
repeatedly, the costs of a risk-redistribution response rise to 
pay for repeated high losses, increasing the expense to others 
in the pool. 
Tackling the mismatch: Co-evolving financial and physical 
resilience measures. As highlighted in Section 3, while 
increasing the affordability of cover for policyholders, PGEs 
can affect the risk-reward-responsibility balance. Removing 
responsibility for high risks from policyholders may have 
unintended consequences for those policyholders’ behaviours. 
The issue of subsidizing insurance policies has been analysed 
extensively in the debate on equity vs efficiency – where the 
overall welfare benefits resulting from universal protection 
in a society are weighed against the overall costs for society 
of moral hazard. This literature has generated proposals on 
how to combine policy instruments such as tax incentives or 
building regulations to address the problem.47,48,49 
In Section 5.3 we have considered the issue by placing PGEs 
and insurance within the broader landscape of resilience. We 
discussed how PGEs can play a critical role in coordinating 
the different interventions necessary for financial resilience 
through market measures, and physical resilience through 
public policies for risk reduction and resilient reconstruction. 
This is a critical area in which the remit of PGEs might need to 
be expanded to match the changing nature of the protection 
gap and the expectations of stakeholders.
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6.3  MISMATCH 3: PGE (IR)RELEVANCE IN THE FACE OF AN 
EVOLVING GAP 
PGEs are set up to deal with a local protection gap at a specific 
moment in time. However, protection gaps evolve, so that the 
original gap that the PGE was set up to address might become 
less relevant; or while it remains important, other gaps of equal 
significance may emerge over time. 
One example is terrorism risk, which has evolved significantly 
since the origin of most terrorism PGEs. For example, the 
threat of sophisticated, highly-coordinated, severe events 
like 9/11 may be ever-present. However, increasingly terrorist 
events are ‘lone wolf’ attacks with less catastrophic impact,50 
using familiar, accessible objects, such as cars and knives, 
as weapons. Many of the financial impacts of such attacks, 
such as the business interruption caused by site closure 
after an attack, the loss of revenue from diminished footfall, 
or indeed, the capacity to pay for loss of life, may not be 
covered by PGEs established to cover catastrophic damage 
to commercial property. Thus, a swathe of uninsured risk 
emerges, demonstrating the evolution in the protection gap 
and, post-disaster, the emergence of stakeholder interests and 
expectations where the risk is not addressed within the remit 
of the PGE.51 Quite simply, even if it goes beyond their initial 
remit, PGEs need to remain relevant to the evolving protection 
gap, as this will be expected of them in case of future disasters.
On the other hand, PGEs that can influence the closure 
of a protection gap may also need to co-evolve – into 
obsolescence. For example, while flood risk has increased 
significantly over the last decades it can be significantly 
reduced if risk resilience (Section 5) is taken seriously. 
Measures that promote resilient reconstruction, risk reduction 
and preparedness, alongside financial protection (PGEs 
Resilience Framework; Figure 5.1) can have a real impact on 
reducing the protection gap. Essentially, if the protection gap 
that a PGE was set up to address is not significant anymore, 
the PGE itself may become redundant. 
Tackling the mismatch: Evolving policy dialogue, with regular 
review. Our research study shows that the response to this 
situation can vary significantly. A first strategy is to adapt the 
remit of the PGE, as political or societal awareness of evolving 
threats emerges. For example, as awareness of terrorism threat 
has grown, most terrorism PGEs have evolved from offering 
‘conventional’ terrorism cover for fire and explosion to also 
offering non-conventional cover for chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. In this way, the 
dynamic balance illustrated in Figure 6.1 is preserved as 
stakeholder interest, protection gap, and PGE remit co-evolve. 
Often this process of adaptation is precipitated by a crisis, 
similar to the process leading to the initial establishment of 
PGEs. For instance, some PGEs operating in the terrorism area 
originated only in the wake of 9/11, such as ARPC in Australia; 
elsewhere many existing terrorism PGEs responded by 
expanding their remit to include new categories of CBRN risk. 
Such changes of remit can better be brought about through 
regular policy or legislative review of the PGE. That is, through 
foresight and planning, rather than being forced upon the PGE 
in the aftermath of a new disaster.
Another strategy is to give PGEs a limited lease of life. This is 
done in the assumption that the problem as perceived today is 
temporary and that the PGE will, by its termination date, have 
stimulated sufficient market development to close the gap. For 
instance, the recently established Flood Re in the UK has been 
set up with a specific remit to ‘solve’ the problem for which it 
originated and then dissolve over a 25-year period. While such 
deadlines may simply demonstrate that the PGE has not, in 
fact, solved the protection gap, or may call into question what 
other gaps have arisen, the termination date should generate a 
point of dialogue about the role and remit of the PGE. 
6.4  SUMMARY 
The mismatches detailed in this Section are indicative of the 
inherent tensions that exist when the PGEs’ remit, the interests 
of stakeholders and the protection gap are evolving in parallel 
(Figure 6.1). It would be wrong to understand potential 
mismatches as fundamental problems that need to be fixed. 
Rather, these are naturally-occurring tensions that would 
always exist at the nexus of competing demands upon PGEs, 
which they would have to mediate. 
By actively managing these mismatches, PGEs can powerfully 
frame both the way we understand risk in society, and the role 
of governments, markets and wider stakeholders in managing 
that risk. Although different stakeholders will always have 
different interests in the potential solutions, more use can be 
made of PGEs, not solely as temporary stopgap solutions to 
initial problems but also as spaces in which to host an ongoing 
dialogue about a growing problem.
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SECTION 7. Conclusion. Learning  
from PGE experiences:  
A call-to-arms
This report has provided an impetus for learning across regions 
and sectors, about the nature, characteristics and activities 
of Protection Gap Entities (PGEs); those organizations and 
initiatives set up in collaboration between States and markets 
to bring financial solutions to the socio-economic problems 
caused by the increasing prevalence of natural and man-
made catastrophes. PGEs, while in many ways heterogeneous, 
are set up with the objective to transform uninsured risk 
into insurance-based products that can be transferred onto 
government balance sheets or into global financial markets in 
order to provide capital for recovery following a disaster. This 
report has developed the following findings:
PGEs classification. Beyond their widely recognized sources 
of variation, PGEs may be usefully grouped according to their 
common features:
1. PGEs are partial and temporary solutions to a specific and 
local protection gap – rather than entities set up to tackle 
the overall problem of underinsurance against disasters. 
Specifically, we have shown that PGEs are often set up 
in response to major crises that push stakeholders with 
different market and social interests to collaborate in 
tackling one of three objectives: 
Objective 1: Resolve disruption in (re)insurance supply in 
mature markets; 
Objective 2: Mitigate the threat of unaffordable insurance 
in mature markets; 
Objective 3: Increase the financial viability of sovereign 
states with fragile economies.
2. PGEs tackle these objectives by adopting different 
positions in our Protection Gap Strategic Response 
Framework, in terms of their choices on:
a. how they share risk with existing market players - 
removing versus redistributing risk;
b. what position they occupy in the value chain for risk 
transfer - Insurer PGE, Reinsurer PGE or Market  
Capture PGE.
Each of these choices brings advantages and 
disadvantages.
3. PGEs in sovereign states with fragile economies that are 
highly exposed to natural catastrophe, where there is little 
insurance penetration, develop disaster liquidity products 
as immediate relief post-disaster, rather than as more 
large-scale reconstruction
PGEs functions. Beyond their function in providing financial 
solutions, because of their unique position at the nexus of a 
diverse set of stakeholders, PGEs perform a range of other 
critical functions that are being increasingly recognized as 
important:
1. They act as the locus in which a conversation about the 
evolving nature of the protection gap can take place, 
thereby contributing to framing the debate and policy 
initiatives connected to the protection gap.
2. They play an important role in fostering the development 
of knowledge about perils and how they affect specific 
areas that were not previously tackled by markets; and  
in changing the dynamics of knowledge distribution  
and ownership. 
3. They facilitate risk identification and contribute to making 
it more policy relevant to Government, by providing better 
knowledge about perils and by linking this knowledge to 
the availability of additional financial resources in case  
of disasters. 
In doing so, our PGE Resilience Framework outlines the 
important spillover effects that PGE’s have in informing and 
improving society’s resilience to disasters.
PGE challenges. PGEs face significant challenges, as 
demonstrated by our PGE Evolution Framework, to:
1. Balance the competing demands of different stakeholders, 
both in terms of balancing social and market objectives.
2. Support the more vulnerable portions of society without 
undermining long term resilience by distorting incentives 
and providing grounds for moral hazard. 
3. Adapt their remit so that it matches the evolving 
characteristics of the protection gap but also avoid 
mission creep and loss of effectiveness.
4. Manage stakeholders’ expectations, so that they are not 
perceived as silver bullets to the problem of the protection 
gap, displacing other forms of risk management and 
reduction, particularly those related to resilience.
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This report is by no means a final word on the complex and 
challenging issue of the protection gap. Rather, it has provided 
some new insights about PGEs from which to continue the 
dialogue of how it may be better addressed in different 
contexts by multiple stakeholders. 
This report should be considered as “call to arms” to learn 
from, and make better use of those already established PGEs, 
in order to better address the increasing threat of natural  
and manmade catastrophic disaster, and the growing 
protection gap. 
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Appendix
METHODOLOGY
This report presents the full results from a qualitative research 
study, looking at Protection Gap Entities (PGEs) around the 
world. 
Dataset. The data for this global research study of PGEs 
includes: 
• in-depth interviews of key stakeholders within and around 
PGEs (305 interviews with 359 participants);
• 64 ethnographic observations within a sample of PGEs; 
• participant-observation at 20 key conferences, workshops, 
and meetings, as well as 7 social events; 
• more than 9,500 pages of documentary data such as annual 
reports, press releases and media articles. 
Methodological approach. This research study incorporates 
global breadth and variation in cases. We studied PGEs in 
different countries, employing different governance structures 
and covering different types of risk. We adopted a multi-
stakeholder approach to all cases, accessing data with various 
stakeholders from both the public and private sector. 
Global breadth. We have collected primary data for 13 
PGEs and their stakeholders across 23 countries spanning 
the globe. In addition, our dataset includes PGEs from both 
developing and developed economies. This captures different 
understandings of the protection gap and variation in the 
solutions developed. 
Variation. We selected the 13 PGEs purposively to include 
variation. First, the PGEs represented different governance 
structures. In particular, the selected PGEs range from public 
to private to partnership entities. Second, the selected 
PGEs covered different types of risk, ranging from flood to 
earthquake, tropical cyclone, drought, excess rainfall, and 
terrorism. In addition, some were mono-risk, covering only one 
peril, while others covered multiple perils. While we maintain 
confidentiality over our cases, those participants happy to be 
named are listed on the back page of this report.
Multi-stakeholder approach: As well as global breadth this 
research study focused on developing a holistic, polyvocal 
understanding of PGEs. The study informants consist of:
• the PGEs; 
• insurance market players such as insurers, reinsurers, 
modellers and brokers; 
• government actors such as ministers, governmental 
departments and government-based organizations; 
• intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and 
OECD;
• other key protection gap actors such as independent 
consultants and resilience teams.
The focus was thus not on any particular organization but 
on developing a holistic understanding of the particular 
local solutions to the protection gap via a multi-stakeholder 
approach. 
We thank the PGEs and their stakeholders for the generosity 
and transparency that has made the analysis in this report 
possible. Our engagement with these participants is ongoing 
as we continue to explore the issues outlined in this report. 
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GLOSSARY
ARC (African Risk Capacity) was established in 2012 as a 
Specialised Agency of the African Union (AU), with 18 Member 
States that signed the Establishment Agreement initially, which 
has grown to 33 Member States in 2018. ARC aims to provide 
insurance products that help protect food security in the face 
of extreme weather events, such as drought. 
ARPC (Australian Risk Pool Corporation) is a corporate 
Commonwealth entity established in 2003 and provides 
insurance cover against terrorism in Australia. 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear terrorism 
perils.
CEA (California Earthquake Authority) is a not-for-profit, 
publicly managed, privately funded entity established in 1996 
and provides insurance cover against earthquake in California, 
US. 
CCR (Caisse Centrale de Reassurance) is a public-sector 
reinsurer established in 1946 and provides insurers operating 
in France with multi-peril coverage against natural catastrophes 
and other risks.
CCRIF SPC (Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility) is 
an entity established in 2007 that provides insurance cover for 
hurricane, earthquake ad excess rainfall to its, as in 2018, 16 
Caribbean government-members and one Central American 
government member.
CCS (Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros - Insurance 
Compensation Consortium) is a state-owned entity established 
in 1941 that provides insurance cover for natural and terrorism 
disasters in Spain. 
Crowding out effect is a phenomenon discussed in 
economics in which rising public sector spending drives down 
or even eliminates private sector spending. 
Disaster liquidity is the short-term liquidity necessary in 
the aftermath of disasters to start recovery efforts while 
maintaining essential government service.
EQC (Earthquake Commission) is a public entity established 
in 1945 that provides insurance to residential property owners 
against earthquake and associated perils such as natural 
landslip, volcanic eruption, and hydrothermal activity in  
New Zealand.
Exposure refers to the inventory of elements such as citizens, 
infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other 
tangible human assets in an area in which hazardous events 
may occur. Measures of exposure can include the number of 
citizens or types of assets in an area. 
Financial protection is the financial resilience of 
governments, private sector and citizens through insurance-
based mechanisms.
Flood Re is an insurance pool established in 2016 to provide 
insurance cover against flood in the UK.
FONDEN (Fondo de Desastres Naturales - Natural Disasters 
Fund) is a public entity established in 1996 that provides 
insurance cover to the Mexican States and the Federal 
Agencies against natural disasters. 
GAREAT (Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance des 
risques Attentats et actes de Terrorisme – Management of the 
Insurance and Reinsurance of Risks of Terrorist Attacks and 
Acts of Terrorism) is a private-public partnership established 
in 2002 that provides reinsurance cover against terrorism in 
France. 
Hazard is the condition that can cause a disaster such as a 
hurricane or a tsunami.
Market capture a term that we use to reference the concept 
of ‘regulatory capture’, in which a state organization set up to 
regulate a market in the interests of citizens, ends up instead 
adopting the point of view of the market and so serving its 
interests. The market capture PGE can have the opposite issue, 
in which market parties operating in a context where the PGE 
is highly dominant, can end up assuming that their interests 
are best met through the PGE, so dampening their own risk 
appetite.
Modelled loss is the loss estimated through an insurance 
catastrophe model on the basis of the parameters of the 
event (e.g. wind speed). The event parameters are fed into a 
catastrophe model to calculate the modelled loss.
Parametric insurance is a type of insurance that uses a 
parameter or an index of parameters of the catastrophic event 
as triggers for issuing a payout. Such insurance products may 
combine a mix of triggers from indemnity to industry loss, to 
the occurrence of specific parameters of a peril, such as wind 
speeds within a specified zone. Such products can also be 
linked to modelled losses (as opposed to actual claims for 
losses), triggering a payment when losses exceed a particular 
threshold. However, they do not have to be linked specifically 
to claims for property loss.
Peril is the direct cause of loss such as flood or earthquake.
Pool Re is a reinsurance pool established in 1993 to provide 
reinsurance cover against terrorism in the UK. 
Risk is the possibility of loss.
PCRAFI (Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing 
Initiative) is an entity established in 2016 to provide the Pacific 
Island Countries (PICs) with climate- and disaster-related 
insurance.
Protection gap (global) is the gap between the insured and 
actual economic losses caused by large-scale catastrophic 
events. It refers to a global problem, affecting all countries, and 
referring to the whole uninsured population.
Protection gap (local) refers to specific manifestations of 
underinsurance in a particular region, such as lack of terrorism 
cover for city-centre business districts; insufficient emergency 
capital reserves in developing economies to maintain essential 
services after natural disaster; or unaffordable premiums for 
homeowners in highly exposed flood plains, or in earthquake-
prone regions. 
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Protection Gap Entity (PGE) is the entity that brings together 
different market and non-market stakeholders in an effort to 
address the protection gap by transforming uninsured risk 
into insurance-based products that can be transferred onto 
government balance sheets or into global financial markets in 
order to provide capital for recovery following a disaster. 
Preparedness is the development of early warning systems, 
support of emergency measures and contingency planning to 
prepare for disasters.
Resilient reconstruction is the ex-post reconstruction of 
property and the built environment for quicker, more resilient 
disaster recovery. 
Risk mitigation refers to taking ex-ante action to reduce the 
adverse effects of disasters. 
Risk identification is building the capacity to identify, assess 
and analyse risk, typically as a technical capability supporting 
the quantification of risk assessments and risk communication.
Risk reduction is the reduction of risks in society by 
implementing structural and non-structural measures in policy 
and investment. 
Vulnerability refers to the propensity of exposed elements 
such as individuals, a community, and assets to suffer adverse 
effects of hazardous events.
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